...I'm missing. The historical context of the US Empire and the Japanese Empire in contention in the Western Pacific? The barbarism of the Japanese in their drive to Empire? They win that one hands down.... they killed 4 million in China, and we were responsible for the deaths of only 1 million Filipinos. The take-no-prisoners warfare? The Island Hopping Campaign? The Naval Blockade? The devastating fire raids? The lack of target cities in Japan (except the one "protected" to be targets for the Bomb) after about June of 1945?
Tell me about my lack of historical perspective.
The theories about the bomb included scientists in the project who thought it would start a chain reaction that would take out all of New Mexico, as well as scientists who thought it wouldn't work at all. Trinity worked, but what next? What better place to really test it than on a modern city? The results of the experiment certainly explain Oppenheimer's opposition to the hydrogen bomb.
There never was going to be an invasion and a million US casualties. Truman knew that if he sent hundreds of thousands of Americans to their deaths in an unnecessary invasion, he'd be impeached or worse. The military knew the invasion was unnecessary, and that the Japanese were on the verge of surrender.
I keep posting this, but apparently it's in invisible ink, because nobody seems to understand that all the military brass knew the war was over and we didn't need to use the bomb.
I'll post it again in case somebody actually will read it.
Here's the views of the top Army and Naval and Air Force Officers (find the originals at the site mentioned below.)
In his memoirs Admiral William D. Leahy, the President's Chief of Staff--and the top official who presided over meetings of both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined U.S.-U.K. Chiefs of Staff--minced few words:
" he use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender.
n being the first to use it, we . . . adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children." (See p. 3, Introduction)
Privately, on June 18, 1945--almost a month before the Emperor's July intervention to seek an end to the war and seven weeks before the atomic bomb was used--Leahy recorded in his diary: "It is my opinion at the present time that a surrender of Japan can be arranged with terms that can be accepted by Japan and that will make fully satisfactory provisions for America's defense against future trans-Pacific aggression." (See p. 324, Chapter 26)
Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet stated in a public address given at the Washington Monument on October 5, 1945:
"The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace before the atomic age was announced to the world with the destruction of Hiroshima and before the Russian entry into the war." (See p. 329, Chapter 26) . . .
In a private 1946 letter to Walter Michels of the Association of Philadelphia Scientists, Nimitz observed that "the decision to employ the atomic bomb on Japanese cities was made on a level higher than that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." (See pp. 330-331, Chapter 26)
Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., Commander U.S. Third Fleet, stated publicly in 1946:
"The first atomic bomb was an unnecessary experiment. . . . It was a mistake to ever drop it. . . . had this toy and they wanted to try it out, so they dropped it. . . . It killed a lot of Japs, but the Japs had put out a lot of peace feelers through Russia long before." (See p. 331, Chapter 26)
The commanding general of the U.S. Army Air Forces, Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, gave a strong indication of his views in a public statement only eleven days after Hiroshima was attacked. Asked on August 17 by a New York Times reporter whether the atomic bomb caused Japan to surrender, Arnold said:
"The Japanese position was hopeless even before the first atomic bomb fell, because the Japanese had lost control of their own air."
On September 20, 1945 the famous "hawk" who commanded the Twenty-First Bomber Command, Major General Curtis E. LeMay (as reported in The New York Herald Tribune) publicly: He said flatly at one press conference that the atomic bomb "had nothing to do with the end of the war." He said the war would have been over in two weeks without the use of the atomic bomb or the Russian entry into the war. (See p. 336, Chapter 27)
On the 40th Anniversary of the bombing former President Richard M. Nixon reported that:
" MacArthur once spoke to me very eloquently about it, pacing the floor of his apartment in the Waldorf. He thought it a tragedy that the Bomb was ever exploded. MacArthur believed that the same restrictions ought to apply to atomic weapons as to conventional weapons, that the military objective should always be limited damage to noncombatants. . . . MacArthur, you see, was a soldier. He believed in using force only against military targets, and that is why the nuclear thing turned him off. . . . "(See p. 352, Chapter 28)
In his memoirs President Dwight D. Eisenhower reports the following reaction when Secretary of War Stimson informed him the atomic bomb would be used:
"During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. . . . "(See p. 4, Introduction)
Eisenhower made similar private and public statements on numerous occasions. For instance, in a 1963 interview he said simply: ". . . it wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing." (See pp. 352-358, Chapter 28)
http://www.colorado.edu/AmStudies/lewis/2010/atomicdec....