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http://www.isreview.org/issues/20/CIA_binladen_afghan.shtml1 For historical background on Afghanistan, see Raja Anwar, The Tragedy of Afghanistan (New York: Verso, 1988); Gérard Chaliand, Report from Afghanistan (New York: Penguin Books, 1982); Jonathan Neale, "The Afghan tragedy," International Socialism, Spring 1981; and Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 2 The British government has issued a document claiming to "prove" bin Laden’s guilt, but the supposed evidence is extremely weak. See Robert Fisk, "This loose conjecture is unlikely to cut much ice with the Arab nations," Independent (London), October 5, 2001. 3 "A bitter harvest," Economist, September 13, 2001. 4 Chaliand, pp. 37—38. 5 According to Fred Halliday, who at the time was a supporter of the PDPA, "the roots of the rebellion lie within Afghan society itself and in the reaction of the rural population to the imposition of reforms from the centre." The Making of the Second Cold War (New York: Verso, 1983), p. 155 6 New York Times, July 1, 1978. Cited in William Blum, Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions since World War II (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1995), p. 341. 7 Chaliand, pp. 39—40. 8 Chaliand, p. 41. 9 Washington Post, May 11, 1979. Cited in Blum, Killing Hope. 10 Lawrence Lifschultz, "Afghan negotiations: Can the pieces fit into place?" Nation, May 31, 1986, p. 753. 11 Blum, Killing Hope, p. 344. 12 Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). 13 La Nouvel Observateur (France), January 15—21, 1998. A classified State Department document–one of many found during the November 1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and later made public–reveals that the aid began at least as early as June, before Carter’s directive. See Blum, Killing Hope, p. 435. Tim Weiner claims that the CIA had begun training guerrillas in Pakistan in 1978. See Weiner, Blank Check: The Pentagon’s Black Budget (New York: Warner Books, 1990), pp. 145—46. 14 Blum, Killing Hope, p. 347. This was another of the documents from the Tehran Embassy. The report continued, "The overthrow of the DRA would show the rest of the world, particularly the Third World, that the Soviets’ view of the socialist course of history as being inevitable is not accurate."
15 San Francisco Chronicle, August 4, 1979. Cited in Blum, Killing Hope.
16 Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair, Whiteout: The CIA, Drugs and the Press (New York: Verso, 1998), pp. 257—58.
17 Washington Post, February 15, 1980. The article claims that "U.S. covert aid prior to the December invasion, according to sources, was limited to funneling small amounts of medical supplies and communications equipment to scattered rebel tribes, plus what is described as ‘technical advice’ to the rebels about where they could acquire arms on their own." Quoted in Blum, Killing Hope, p. 344.
18 Washington Post, January 13, 1985. Quoted in Blum, Killing Hope, p. 345. Blum suggests the unnamed official may also have been Stansfield Turner.
19 Quoted in Cockburn and St. Clair, p. 258.
20 Washington Post, January 13, 1985. Quoted in Blum, Killing Hope, p. 345.
21 Cockburn and St. Clair, p. 263.
22 Weiner, p. 149. Quoted in Blum, Killing Hope.
23 Dilip Hiro, "The cost of an Afghan ‘victory,’" Nation, February 15, 1999.
24 La Nouvel Observateur, interview.
25 Steve Coll, "Anatomy of a victory: CIA’s covert Afghan war," Washington Post, July 19, 1992.
26 Blum, Killing Hope, p. 345, citing classified State Department documents from the Tehran Embassy.
27 Quoted in Cockburn and St. Clair, p. 259.
28 Coll, "Anatomy of a victory."
29 That same month, Reagan met in Washington with Abdul Haq, one of the mujahideen leaders. At a time when he was denouncing Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress for its refusal to renounce violence, Reagan heaped praise on Haq, who openly took responsibility for terrorist acts such as planting a bomb in the Kabul airport in 1984 that killed 28 people. Haq also met with British prime minister Margaret Thatcher.
30 Coll, "Anatomy of a victory."
31 Coll, "Anatomy of a victory."
32 Coll, "In CIA’s covert Afghan war, where to draw the line was key," Washington Post, July 20, 1992.
33 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 130.
34 D. Ian Hopper, "U.S. sent guns to bin Laden in 1980s," Associated Press, October 16, 2001.
35 Michael Moran, "Bin Laden comes home to roost," MSNBC, August 24, 1998. For CIA denials of connections to bin Laden see, for instance, Debra Saunders, "Bin Laden is not our Frankenstein," San Francisco Chronicle, October 2, 2001; and Charles M. Sennott, "American troops face being killed by a gift from the CIA," Boston Globe, September 23, 2001. For much more on the CIA—bin Laden connection, see John K. Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America, and International Terrorism, 2nd ed. (Sterling, Va.: Pluto Press, 2000).
36 Rahul Bedi, "Why? An attempt to explain the unexplainable," Jane’s Information Group, September 14, 2001, available on the Web at www.janes.com.
37 Hiro, "The cost of an Afghan ‘victory.’"
38 Blum, Rogue State: A Guide to the World’s Only Superpower, chapter 2 (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 2000).
39 Los Angeles Times, August 4, 1996.
40 Peter Marsden, The Taliban: War, Religion, and the New Order in Afghanistan (New York: Zed Books, 1988), pp. 36—42.
41 Tim Weiner, "Blowback from the Afghan battlefield," New York Times, March 13, 1994. Weiner points out that "Hekmatyar’s weapons...come mainly from the enormous arsenal sent by the CIA. The United States and its allies gave him more than $1 billion in armaments: tens of thousands of assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades, millions of rounds of ammunition, hundreds of the deadly accurate Stinger missiles." Hekmatyar’s forces were not dislodged until March 1995.
42 Rashid, p. 32. Rashid’s book in particular is vital reading for anyone who wants to understand the roots of the current crisis.
43 In addition to Marsden’s book, see Michael Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind: The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan (Sterling, Va.: Pluto Press, 2001).
44 Quoted in Sanjay Suri, "CIA worked with Pakistan to create Taliban," India Abroad News Service, March 6, 2001.
45 Quoted in "U.S. gave silent blessing to Taliban rise to power: analysts," Agence-France Presse, October 7, 2001. For further discussion of U.S. support for the Taliban, see Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed, "Afghanistan, the Taliban and the United States: The role of human rights in Western foreign policy," available at on the International Socialist Organization’s Web site at www.internationalsocialist.org/Afghanistan.shtml.
46 Rashid, p. 166.
47 Rashid, p. 179.
48 Marjorie Cohn, "Cheney’s black gold: Oil interests may drive U.S. foreign policy," Chicago Tribune, August 10, 2000.
49 Rashid, part 3. The main players have included the United States, Russia, China, Iran, and the European Union.
50 The consortium also included Saudi-based Delta Oil, Pakistan’s Crescent Group, and Russia’s Gazprom. Unocal’s chief competitor was the Argentinean oil company Bridas. See Rashid, chapters 12 and 13, for details.
51 The phrase is Rashid’s.
52 "U.S. gave silent blessing to Taliban rise to power."
53 John Burns, "State Department becomes cooler to the new rulers of Kabul," New York Times, October 23, 1996.
54 Cooley, p. 220. Following this attack, Unocal finally withdrew from the pipeline project.
55 Laura Flanders, "Out of the past," WorkingForChange, September 25, 2001, available on their Web site at www.workingforchange.com. Even after the imposition of sanctions, the U.S. government looked for ways to reestablish a relationship with the Taliban. Earlier this year, the Bush administration praised the Taliban for cracking down on opium production in some areas and awarded it a $43 million grant. See Robert Scheer, "CIA’s tracks lead in disastrous circle," Los Angeles Times, September 17, 2001.
and the newspaper article i linked you to backs up the unocal material.
how about those rawa statements from 1998, eh?
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