If politics is a game,what might game theory say about democratic politics?

HereSince1628

(1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore

Thu Aug-12-10 10:25 AM
Original message

If politics is a game,what might game theory say about democratic politics?

Edited on Thu Aug-12-10 10:26 AM by HereSince1628

I'll assume that the political arena contains only 2 parties and that politicians may be be hardliners (H) or compromisers (C). For mathematical simplicity, voters who don�t vote are left out of this discussion, Now let�s assume that in response to their legislative performance voters expend their franchise in as much as they approve (+) or dissaprove (-) of their law-makers. As a consequence, political behavior may bring benefits (B) or costs (C) at the ballot box.

The payoff schedule here is that for the well-known HAWK vs DOVE game model and if you are inclined to do so you can explore that via the search engine of your choice.

In terms of politics the payoffs in this game would (under these admittedly very simple assumptions) yield the following:

Zero, for compromisers who always deal with hardliners. The hardliners earn the approval of their base
while the compromisers gain disapproval of their base.

B, for hardliners who only deal with compromisers.

0.5B for compromisers whose opponents are also compromisers (assuming equal winning and losing)

�(B-C) for hardliners who must deal with opponother hardliners

Knowing these payoffs might help to explain why one party would choose to be hardline (i.e. NO-P), in the face of a party that compromises and ends up being the party of Can�t Make It Happen.

It�s easy to see in the real world how a Compromiser may believe that they are being practicing pragmatic statesmanship within the legislature. Americans have traditionally been raised to believe this IS the American way.

Admittedly, this strategy does accrue benefits, and becauase benefites are equally shared, the party with the largest electorate should win the most elections.

But in recent decades, the dems, the party that polls with the largest base, hasn�t accomplished that. And, at least theoretically, it may be because the dems face opponents who are dedicated hardliners. If the electorate is evenly split (as it seems very close to being in the US) it is impossible to get around the reality that B > 0.5 B (What think tank fed Gingrich Game Theory???)

Why despite complaints from the electorate about deadlock in Congress, do the republicans seem unlikely to be moved to be moved by calls from democratic leaders for compromise. Because being a hardliner when the opposition compromises IS a much better strategy (atleast theoretically, and seemingly in recent practice)!

The strategy seemingly UNCHOSEN by the pragamatic democratics in Congress (but repeatedly called for by progressives)is to be hardline in the face of hardline opposition. This strategy will win so long as the democrats accrue more electoral benefits than costs at the polls. This is particualarly feasible when the proportion of the democratic base in the population is larger than the sum of swing voters and republican voters. This is a nation with a polarized electorate, is the swing vote really more important than the discourage portion of the democratic base?

Being a hardline Congressional democrat might result in little being accomplished during a session, but so long as the base approves of the legislative attempts, in theory, it seems to be at an advantage over pre-emptive compromise as was seen on HCR where the democrats electoral base was overwhelmingly approving.

And of course this game begs the question of the importance of the base, relative to the way elected officials percieve the importance of other social components to their political careers, such as their campaign donations, and corruption...