Any other country that pulled this shit and they would have been held up as "against us" and "with the terrorists".
Highlights from a 2006 cable:
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/04/06ABUDHABI1401.htmlWhile AbZ, like MbZ, expressed support for
U.S. initiatives against Iran, he stated that the USG should
come to the UAE as a "very last resort. ... If you can solve
something without involving the UAE, please do so." -The UAE remains a committed partner in the
global war on terror,
but it continues to take an ad hoc
approach to countering terrorism that "solves" the problem
for the UAE locally, but fails to contribute on a
transnational basis.-Although the UAE regards Iran as one of its most
serious threats to national security,
UAE officials are
reluctant to take actions that could anger their neighbor and
compromise their extensive trading relationship.-The UAEG government reacts quickly when presented with
evidence of a terrorist presence inside the UAE,
but does not
approach the problem from a transnational manner. The UAE's
immediate response when terrorists pose a risk is to deport
them. UAE agencies do not investigate fully to see how far
the problem goes or whether there is an international network
involved. Although the U.S./UAE counterterrorism cooperation
is strong (with the UAE working closely with the USG on
specific cases),
Emiratis do not consistently share lead
information found in the possession of individuals in their
custody with each other or with the U.S. Government. These
tactics limit law enforcement and intelligence services'
ability to use intelligence to disrupt extremist cells and
planned attacks.
The UAE's insistence on deportation as a
solution does not protect the country long-term or truly
address the nature and scope of the problem -UAE feels vulnerable--as evidenced by the fact that its
leaders frequently note that Iran is "very near" the UAE.
Commercial ties between Dubai and Iran are significant (Dubai
is Iran's largest non-oil trading partner), and as a result
the UAEG walks a fine line between maintaining and
encouraging this trade and working to prevent suspected
Iranian proliferation activities. Although the UAEG is
worried about Iran's nuclear ambitions, its short-term policy
decisions regarding Iran center on not provoking its
neighbor. The USG has approached the UAEG four times since
January, asking it to interdict and inspect cargo suspected
of going to Iran's nuclear and/or missile programs.
None of
those instances have resulted in a successful interdiction.
In the first two instances UAE officials simply refused to
take action (refs F and G).