U.S. diplomacy and Cuban dissidence
By Salim Lamrani
Introduction
For half a century, U.S. foreign policy toward Havana, which goal is regime change, has rested on two pillars: drastic economic sanctions that affect all sectors of Cuban society and the organization and financing of internal opposition. Thus, on April 6, 1960 Lester D. Mallory, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, recalled in a memorandum to Roy R. Rubottom Jr., then Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, the objective of economic sanctions:
“The majority of Cubans support Castro <…> There is no effective political opposition <…>. The only foreseeable means of alienating internal support
is through disenchantment and disaffection based on economic dissatisfaction and hardship <…>.
Every possible means should be undertaken promptly to weaken the economic life <…> denying money and supplies to Cuba, to decrease monetary and real wages, to bring about hunger, desperation and overthrow of government.”1
From 1959 to 1990, the program of fostering internal dissent was kept secret. But, partially declassified U.S. files confirm the existence of multiple programs to create an opposition to the government of Fidel Castro, which would serve the interests of the United States in their quest for regime change. In 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the financial and logistical support to Cuban dissidents became public and was integrated into U.S. law.
Funding internal opposition
During a meeting of the National Security Council on January 14, 1960, Undersecretary Livingston Merchant stated: Our objective is to tighten all our actions with a view to accelerate the development of an opposition in Cuba <…>”. Mr. Rubottom added that “the approved program has authorized us to offer our help to elements that oppose Castro’s government in Cuba so that it seems as if its fall might be a result of their own mistakes”.2
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