Govt to increase security for opposition party after death threats

[Judi Lynn]

Govt to increase security for opposition party after death threats
Wednesday, 25 May 2011 11:43
Tom Heyden

Colombia's Interior and Justice Minister German Vargas Lleras said that the government will increase security measures for members of opposition party Polo Democratico amid death threats from neo-paramilitaries, El Espectador reported Wednesday.

The president of the Polo Democratico, Clara Lopez Obregon has reported receiving death threats from neo-paramilitary group "Aguilas Negras," as well as being traced by Colombia's disgraced intelligence agency DAS.

Vargas reacted openly to the reports, stating that "I am completely willing to listen to all complaints that may present themselves, about the new elements that are affecting the security of members of the Polo ," he said.

He noted that the government is already providing security protection to the opposition party members but said that the government is willing to respond to the calls for increased safety.

More:
http://www.colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/16512-govt-to-increase-security-for-opposition-party-after-death-threats.html

It's important to remember Colombia is the 3rd largest recipient of US taxpayers' annual foreign aid gift.

[naaman fletcher]

1. didn't realize they were third. thanks for the info

It prompted me to google a bit. Here is a list someone put together of US foreign aid:

http://www.vaughns-1-pagers.com/politics/us-foreign-aid.htm

I basically don't think the US should be giving aid to any of these countries except perhaps the Kenyan and Ethiopian aid.

[gbscar]

2. Not a chance, considering a large part goes right back to U.S. contractors and corporations

Which is probably the one true "gift" here, particularly once you look past the list of countries and notice how the resources allocated translate to the supply of military hardware, equipment, training and several other services classified as "aid" that end up in the hands of a relatively small number of companies.

In this particular case, I do not support the continuation of U.S. military aid to Colombia but, at the same time, I'm not under any illusions concerning the matter of ongoing threats, when both state and non-state actors (including those otherwise linked to the state and those which have actually developed their own interests along the way) have a very long history of threatening and killing people dating back to the time before the term Plan Colombia ever came into existence. Pulling the plug would have, if anything, more of a political impact than one affecting the existence of both public and private criminal activity.

[naaman fletcher]

3. yes,

in fact, the vast majority of it goes right back to US contractors.

[rabs]

4. But is a large part actually coming back to U.S. contractors/corporations?

I spotted an article in Semana last month that said Israel had been (and maybe still is) getting a hefty chunk of Colombian military expenditures. Almost 40 percent, while JuanMa Santos was defense minister under Uribe.

A quick google also yielded the following purchases in recent years (during Uribe):

-- 25 Supertucano from Brazil for 240 million dollars
-- June 2008, two Casa C295 from Spain, part of a deal to buy four troop transport aircraft for 120 million dollars.
-- In 2009 Israel Aeroesoace Industries delivered the first Kafir C12 of 13 bought by Colombia. Cost, nearly 160 million dollars of the deal signed in 2007. Contract also called for moderization of another Kafir fighters already in the inventory of the FAC.
-- FAC bought a Boeing 767 for 57 million dollars to refuel combat aircraft in flight. (The article did not say from whom the plane was acquired.)
-- Oct. 2006, Colombian army and Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation pacted for the sale of 15 UH-60L combat helicopters (Black Hawks) from the inventory of the U.S. Army Foreign Military Sales. The choppers are therefore second hand. The first six were delivered in July 2009. Contract worth 225 million dollars. (I think a couple of Black Hawks have gone down in the past year.)
-- In April 2006, the army acquired 15 artillery pieces 155/52 APU SBT (155 mm) from the Spanish company GDSBS. Cost, 13.5 million euros. The rest were to be delivered that year.

-------------------

Adding the figures, it amounts to nearly 1 bbbillon dollars, with a large part of that NOT coming back to U.S. contractors/corporations.

Semana article from last month. Interesante, the Israeli role in the Colombian war.

http://www.semana.com/nacion/wikileaks-papel-israel-contra-farc/153602-3.aspx

[naaman fletcher]

5. interesting,

thanks.

I have generally been under the impression that most FMS sales are steered towards US contractors, although this clearly is not the case in Colombia.

[gbscar]

6. You're forgetting one detail: Colombia has a yearly defense budget which dwarfs yearly U.S. aid

True, Colombia does buy a lot of crap from the Israelis and Brazilians, among others, but...did that money come from the U.S.? No, not likely.

If we are going to count all sorts of Colombian military expenditures, including purchases from non-U.S. sources like those you've listed, it would be reasonable to actually mention how much money Colombia itself brings to the equation.

In other words, all Colombian military expenditures aren't inherently funded by -nor limited to- the aid provided by the U.S. Far from it. This seems to be a very common misconception around here but it's not supported by the data.

Even less so when Uribe spent his entire term increasing the local resources assigned to the defense budget (at the expense of other sectors).

Let's look at the numbers:

In 2002, Alvaro Uribe’s first year in office, U.S. military and police assistance to Colombia totaled $388.6 million. In 2008, it is a bit higher, at $433.7 million. While the aid amounts are similar, the U.S. contribution has shrunk rapidly as a proportion of Colombia’s own defense effort. In 2002, U.S. aid was equivalent to about one eleventh of Colombia’s defense budget. This year, thanks to a doubling of defense spending and the weak dollar, U.S. aid is equal to only about one twenty-eighth of Colombia’s defense budget.

US Aid Dollars

2002
388,550,141 ($388 million)

2008
433,664,757 ($433 million)

Colombian Defense Budget Dollars

2002
4,186,135,410 ($4 billion)

2008
12,328,723,355 ($12 billion)

Source:

http://www.cipcol.org/?p=642

Colombia alone can -and does- literally spend multiple times the total amount of U.S. military aid during any given year. Do the math.

In other words, the Colombian government does not primarily rely on foreign support to make all the military purchases you've linked to, nor do they exclusively depend on the availability of U.S. funds.

That U.S. support frees up a few additional funds to help make several of those purchases is a viable conclusion, but the gap between the total amount of money Uncle Sam provides per year and the total amount of money Colombia spends per year is so huge as to make the difference seem almost ridiculous. Again, just look at the figures and try to make a comparison. The 2010 and 2011 numbers aren't any better.

Therefore, assuming that Brazilian Supertucanos were necessarily bought using U.S. resources is questionable. There is a far clearer and infinitely more direct link between U.S. funds and how much, say, a DynCorp contract is worth. Even if we were to take any funds spent on gross corruption into account, on both fronts, the picture barely changes.

It's also one more reason why I support cutting current U.S. military aid to Colombia as both a moral and practical matter.

[rabs]

7. If I understood the issue correctly

it was whether Plan Colombia funds were returning to U.S. defense companies/contractors.

IIRC last year Plan Colombian contributed about 550 million dollars (true, a few million some went to projects other than the war). Obviously some of that probably went to a few U.S. military interests, but some also went to Israel, Brazil and South Africa.

Yes, the overall defense budget (12 bbbillion dollars) dwarfs the Plan Colombia annual contributions. Still, since 1990, Plan Colombia has given Colombian seven bbbillion dollars.

Couple of years ago I commented on this forum that endless war is good business for the powers that be in Colombia. For driving hundreds of thousands of campesinos from their lands for palm oil plantations, for the extraction industries (especially coal), for the paramilitary'a cocaine industry and for generally just taking over fertile lands.

So, a combined military and police force of 450,000 cannot defeat FARC, which at one time had about 12,000 fighters? Understand that between FARC and ELN they can come up with about 10,000 now. And this has been going for half a century!

------------------
Fighting the drugs trade fueling Latin America’s oldest guerrilla war and relying heavily on U.S. military assistance, Colombia has the second-largest armed forces in Latin America, after Brazil. Unlike Brazil’s peaceful situation, Colombia has an ongoing internal armed conflict spilling also over its border with Venezuela.

In 2011, Colombia is expected to spend 20 percent of its national budget on defense, representing 3.9 percent its entire economy. At this level, Bogota is spending the highest percentage of its GDP on defense in the region.


http://defense-update.com/wp/20110316_laad-focus-colombia.html

(Noticed that the Boeing refueling tanker came from Israel.)

Btw, thanks for your comments. Thought provoking.

-------------------------------

Presupuestos de defensa colombianos para 2011.
Lunes 04 de Octubre de 2010 08:57

Colombia destinara para 2.011 cerca de 11.987 millones de dólares del presupuesto general de la Nación destinado al sector defensa, de este total cerca de 11.000 millones serán para de funcionamiento y 987 para inversión. De este rubro 8.000 millones serán para el Ministerio de Defensa, 3.281 millones para la Policía y algo más de 200 millones para el Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad –DAS- (Agencia de Inteligencia dependiente de la Presidencia de la Republica).

De igual forma y como resultado del segundo recaudo del impuesto al patrimonio como fuente extrapresupuestaria se recibirán para la vigencia fiscal 2.011-2.014 un promedio de U$ 1.387 millones de dólares anuales que vendrán a reforzar el bajo presupuesto de inversión que queda del presupuesto ordinario, y será principalmente destinado a mantener las capacidades existentes y adquirir armamento polivalente.


Defensa.com

[gbscar]

8. I agree with some of your points, but not with the larger one

Obviously some of that probably went to a few U.S. military interests, but some also went to Israel, Brazil and South Africa.

With so much more non-U.S. money (by at least an order of magnitude) allocated to military expenditures, how can you possibly tell?

It seems a leap of logic. In addition, U.S. aid is destined for concrete purposes by the U.S. Congress, as opposed to being "free" dollars falling from the sky with no assigned destination and given to Colombia with no strings attached. This includes which companies and which contractors are involved. Whether or not they also carry out "black" operations or human rights abuses on the side (there are such signs and indications), this isn't like breaking a piñata full of candy where the U.S. blindly trusts that Colombia will use the money properly. Of course, since human creativity and innovation is so great, corruption still finds a way.

But that's not the point. Last time I checked, the purchase of, say, the Brazilian Supertucanos isn't contemplated by U.S. aid. And why would it be some kind of secret when Colombia alone doesn't even lack the funds? We aren't talking about buying current generation aircraft here, in terms of both price and combat specifications (please allow me to laugh if someone brings up the Israeli Kfirs as a response...because no matter how many times you upgrade them, old age takes a toll on those ancient airframes).


Yes, the overall defense budget (12 bbbillion dollars) dwarfs the Plan Colombia annual contributions. Still, since 1990, Plan Colombia has given Colombian seven bbbillion dollars.

I believe you meant 1999, no? But well...how many billion dollars do you think have been spent on the overall defense budget since Plan Colombia started? Much more than 7 billion.

What's more, increases in the local defense budget have even coincided with cuts to overall U.S. aid (and mainly on the military side) in recent years. The 2002 defense budget alone was half of that 7 billion and current budgets are over 1.5 times greater than the accumulated total of U.S. aid. In other words, yearly U.S. aid is still a rather small piece of the real pie in comparison, when a single year of defense spending can swallow up more resources than all the Plan Colombia funds provided since 1999.

Couple of years ago I commented on this forum that endless war is good business for the powers that be in Colombia. For driving hundreds of thousands of campesinos from their lands for palm oil plantations, for the extraction industries (especially coal), for the paramilitary'a cocaine industry and for generally just taking over fertile lands.

The greater tragedy, at least in my own opinion, is that's only part of the problem.

Yes, there are interested parties who benefit from the war in exactly the way you've described (and others you haven't).

They do intentionally influence the continuation of the conflict or otherwise wish to extend the status quo.

But even those parties have not been monolithic throughout history and they do not have absolute control over the situation.

A detailed analysis would require breaking them up into groups and individuals as well as tracking their evolution, which is far from resembling a straight line.

So, a combined military and police force of 450,000 cannot defeat FARC, which at one time had about 12,000 fighters? Understand that between FARC and ELN they can come up with about 10,000 now. And this has been going for half a century!

I believe all of those figures are open to debate and, in any case, they have been very fluid in both directions as opposed to static (guerrilla estimates are always questionable and the total number of military and police is almost a paper tiger in practice as opposed to theory). Still, this is where many other complications also start showing up.

Including but not limited to geography, demographics, a weak central state, underdeveloped territories, the rise of the drug trade as a source of direct and indirect income for all parties, the twin processes of increased democratization and increased political violence, official neglect of poverty and inequality or other socio-economic factors, corruption, inconsistent security and defense policies, inconsistent peace negotiations, incompetent and self-absorbed military leadership, incompetent and self-absorbed guerrilla leadership, incompetent and self-absorbed government leadership, the existence of more rebel groups than just the current FARC and ELN, numerous agents provocateurs, sheer bad luck and the direct or indirect interference of the United States of America in these proceedings throughout the history of Colombia.

There are several competing theories and interpretations, of course, but the better ones usually include a plurality or more of the above factors.