This is a challenging blog entry... full of food for thought. The topic is how these crazy economic events happen when what
seem to be the narrow economic causes are not big enough to cause the effect.
Paul Krugman
January 13, 2010, 7:16 am
Percents And SensibilityBrad DeLong makes a very good point:
If you believe that the Fed kept the fed funds rate 2% below its proper Taylor-rule value for 3 years, that has a 6% impact on the price of a long-duration asset like housing. Even with a lot of positive-feedback trading built in, that’s not enough to create a big bubble. And it wasn’t the bubble’s collapse that caused the current depression–2000-2001 saw a bigger bubble collapse, and no depression.
This is actually a very broad problem with all accounts of the crisis that try to exonerate the private sector and place the blame on the government and/or the Fed: none of the proposed evil deeds of policy makers were remotely large enough to cause problems of this magnitude unless markets vastly overreacted. That is, you have to start by assuming wildly dysfunctional financial markets before you can blame the government for the crisis; and if markets are that dysfunctional, who needs the government to create a mess?
This logic applies, as Brad suggests, to all attempts to explain the crisis in terms of excessively low Fed funds rates for a few years. It applies to John Cochrane’s story that financial markets are efficient, but were terrorized by George W. Bush’s scary speech, and John Taylor’s basically similar claim that policy uncertainty in the couple of weeks after Lehman fell did it. It applies to claims that the Community Reinvestment Act and/or Fannie Freddie somehow led to massive bubbles in high-end housing and commercial real estate.
Put it this way: if our financial system is so high-strung, so manic-depressive, that low rates for a few years can inflate a monstrous bubble, while a few discouraging words from high officials can send them into a tailspin*, this doesn’t make the case that policy must walk on eggshells, forgoing any attempt to fight prolonged unemployment. Instead, it makes the case for much, much stronger financial regulation.
*I find myself thinking of the old comedy routine in which a doctor tells his patient, “You’re a very sick man; the least shock could kill you” — whereupon the patient lets out a strangled cry and drops dead.
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/13/percents-and-sensibility/