Or "why it's not that easy." (And WHY didn't he write this six months ago so this WHOLE thing would have made more sense to me?)
The unintended consequences of reconciliationJoe Lieberman's compromise, it seems, is no compromise. And he's infuriated so many Senate and House Democrats, not to mention so many in the Democratic base, that his bitter reversal might have made the prospects of any compromise a lot more remote. Based on chats I've had today, tensions are higher, both in the House and the Senate. And as the grudge begins to seem more personal, the liberals are both more resistant to being rolled, and more worried about it. It's one thing to swallow your own pride, after all. It's quite another to infuriate your base.
Democrats will look toward Olympia Snowe at this point, but if nothing works out, they may have to open the question of reconciliation once more. The irony is that the strange workings of the reconciliation process would strip the bill of the parts that Lieberman, Snowe and others favor and replace them with the exact policies they oppose.
For a detailed primer on the reconciliation process, head here.
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_fifty_vote_senateshort version is that reconciliation, which short-circuits the filibuster, can only be used for legislation that directly affects the federal budget. Anything that "indirectly" affects the budget -- think insurance regulations, like the ban on preexisting conditions -- would be ineligible.
What would be eligible? Well, Medicare buy-in, for one thing. Medicaid expansions. The public option. Anything, in short, that relies on a public program, rather than a new regulation in the private market. That means we'd probably lose the regulations on insurers, many of the delivery-side reforms, the health insurance exchanges, the individual mandate and much else.
Reconciliation, in other words, tips the bill towards an expansion of the public sector rather than a restructuring of the private sector. That makes it much less congenial to conservative Democrats and moderate Republicans (not to mention more conservative Republicans). But it also doesn't need as many of their votes, as it can pass the Senate with 50, rather than 60, in support.
To be very clear, this is not a trade I'm eager to see reformers make. You lose too much in reconciliation, and gain too little. The exchanges are too important, and so too are the insurance regulations and delivery-system reforms. But if Democrats end up in reconciliation, this bill is going to get a lot worse from the perspective of its skeptics.
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2009/12/the_unintended_consequences_of.html