On Thursday, The Supreme Court’s seven justices unanimously overturned the ruling of the appeals panel, though two of the justices issued their own reasoning for allowing Mr. Emanuel to run. In the majority’s opinion, which was written by Justice Robert Thomas, a Republican (and a onetime kicker for the Chicago Bears), the justices raised sharp questions about what the appellate court had concluded, suggesting that such questions of residency had essentially been settled in this state for 150 years – until this week. "Things changed, however, when the appellate court below issued its decision and announced that it was no longer bound by any of the law cited above," the justice wrote, continuing later, "but was instead free to craft its own original standard for determining a candidate’s residency."
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/us/politics/28chicago.html?hpI will quote a portion from the Supreme Court's unanimous (7-0) decision today:
Before proceeding to the merits, we wish to emphasize that, until
just a few days ago, the governing law on this question had been
settled in this State for going on 150 years. In Smith v. People ex rel.
Frisbie, 44 Ill. 16 (1867), this court was faced with a question
remarkably similar to that which is before us today. Smith, a longtime
resident of Illinois, had been appointed a circuit judge by the governor
of Illinois, and a quo warranto action was brought to remove Smith
from that office on the grounds that he had not been an Illinois
resident “for at least five years next preceding *** his appointment,”
as the Illinois Constitution then required. In support of their action,
the objectors pointed to the fact that Smith had moved with his family
to Tennessee for eight months during the relevant five-year residency
period.
In concluding that Smith’s eight-month sojourn to Tennessee did
not result in an abandonment of his established Illinois residency, this
court explained that, once established, “residence is lost *** by a
union of intention and acts” and that “the intention in many cases will
be inferred from the surrounding circumstances.” Smith, 44 Ill. at 24.
This court then examined the “surrounding circumstances” and found
that (1) Smith frequently declared that his move to Tennessee was
only an experiment; (2) just two months after arriving in Tennessee,
Smith expressed a desire to return to Illinois as soon as became
feasible; (3) Smith at no time expressed an unqualified intention to
remain in Tennessee; (4) Smith declined to vote in a Tennessee
election because “he desired to do no act by which he would lose his
citizenship in ”; (5) he refused to sell his Illinois law books
prior to his move, saying that “he would probably return, and would
then need them in his law practice”; and (6) he “only rented
his residence when he left.” Smith, 44 Ill. at 23-24. This
evidence, the court concluded, was insufficient to “establish a
presumption of loss of residence.” Smith, 44 Ill. at 24-25.
Since Smith was decided, the principles established in it have been
consistently and faithfully applied in the candidacy context by the
appellate court of this State. See, e.g., People ex rel. Madigan v.
Baumgartner, 355 Ill. App. 3d 842, 847 (2005) (“ ‘here a person
leaves his residence and goes to another place, even if it be another
tate, with an intention to return to his former abode, or with only
a conditional intention of acquiring a new residence, he does not lose
his former residence so long as his intention remains conditional.’ ”
(quoting Pope v. Board of Election Commissioners, 370 Ill. 196, 201
(1938));
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