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Very few people are familiar with this story, but on the 25th anniversary of the destruction of the space shuttle Challenger with all aboard, I believe a history lesson is in order.
The Challenger explosion was caused by a pair of failed O-ring seals in one of the solid rocket boosters. The failure of these to seal properly resulted in superheated gas exiting the side of the booster at 5,000 degrees, burning through the main liquid hydrogen/oxygen fuel tank, igniting it and destroying the flight.
The primary and backup O-ring seals were well known to be "criticality 1" components, meaning that a failure of both seals would result in the catastrophic destruction of the spacecraft.
This letter is written to insure that management is fully aware of the seriousness of the current O-ring erosion problem in the SRM joints from an engineering standpoint. . . . If the same scenario should occur in a field joint (and it could), then it is a jump ball as to the success or failure of the joint because the secondary O-ring cannot respond to the clevis opening rate and may not be capable of pressurization. The result would be a catastrophe of the highest order - loss of human life. . . .
It is my honest and very real fear that if we do not take immediate action to dedicate a team to solve the problem with the field joint having the number one priority, then we stand in jeopardy of losing a flight along with all the launch pad facilities.
— Roger Boisjoly, Morton Thiokol, Inc. interoffice memo to R. K. Lund, Vice President, Engineering titled SRM O-Ring Erosion/Potential Failure Criticality, sent six months before the Challenger launch, 31 July 1985.
That January, the temperature around the launch site was unusually cold for Florida, hovering around freezing, which prompted the engineers at Morton Thiokol--the company that built the SRBs--to issue a warning to NASA that the O-rings were not guaranteed to seal at such low temperatures. They recommended that in air temperatures lower than 53 degrees at the time of launch, the O-rings were potentially unsafe.
NASA's reaction to this warning was less than positive.
My God, Thiokol, when do you want me to launch, next April?
— Lawrence Mulloy, Solid Rocket Booster Project Director, Marshall Space Flight Center, NASA, regards Morton Thiokol's engineers' warnings, 27 January 1986.
(I'm) appalled at the Thiokol recommendation.
— George Hardy, Deputy Director of Science and Engineering, Marshall Space Flight Center, NASA, regards Morton Thiokol's engineers' warnings, 27 January 1986.
After NASA administrators complained about the recommendation to the executives at Morton Thiokol, Thiokol Senior Vice President Jerry Mason told the firm's chief engineer R. K. Lund to "Take off his engineering hat and put on his management hat." Just 30 minutes after the engineers had issued the hold recommendation, the Morton Thiokol management gave the go-ahead to the launch.
If the primary (o-ring) seal does not seat, the secondary seal will seat. . . . Morton Thiokol recommends STS-51L launch proceed on 28 January 1986.
— Joe C. Kilminster, VP Space Booster Programs, Morton Thiokol, by fax to NASA, January 27 1986.
The following day, launch took place on schedule. 73 seconds after liftoff, the Challenger was destroyed in flight by an explosion resulting from catastrophic O-ring failure, killing it's seven crewmembers.
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