Thermal image taken shortly after the plane crash in WTC

[Ice4Clark]

Doing a bit of googling tonight and found this image. A thermographer was near WTC on 911 and took a few snaps. It's the east side of south tower, taken from the 11th floor of a neighboring building. If the fire was "so" hot, wouldn't the color in the image be white?





Here is one of the North tower, taken from ground level, tho in black and white.




Another interesting bit, when she returned to the location (Oct 25, 2001) to finish her job, she discovered a piece of an aircraft part someone had found on the roof of that building she was in and took a pic of it too. Here's the pic of that.




I think maybe I will try to contact her and see if the part was ever turned over, if by any chance they got a part number off of it and if she has anymore thermal images of the towers.

What do you all think?

[philb]

1. Surely someone would have looked for a part number

since there was a controversy by then.

Is it possible to check it out?

Wouldn't some of the pilots and flight stewards and mechanics out there be able to identify this?

[spooked911]

2. The fires weren't that hot. Particularly since most of the fuel burned up

right away in the fireball.

[janedoe]

3. According to the first color image,

it wasn't even hot enough to boil water! (100°C). Perhaps that's why the people didn't get cooked.

[hack89]

5. How far away from the building was the picture taken?

How do you know that the picture shows core temperatures?

[LARED]

7. Excellent question

I has used "Jersey Infrared Consultants" a few dozen times over the years and they are a good organization.

http://www.irinfo.org/articles/article_9_11_2001.html

Distance plays a major role in the accuracy of infrared thermography. Unless her equipment was properly set up for shooting from about 1000 feet away I would not put much faith in the temperature profile.

[vincent_vega_lives]

56. You really believe that?

That ANY kind of office/house/campfire conflagration could possibly burn at 100 degrees C? Are you joking?

[petgoat]

98. Campfires burn at 400 to 600 degrees C.

But a 600 degree fire and 600 degree steel are two very different
things. NIST has no core samples showing heating above 250 degrees.
None.

[janedoe]

99. Here's a hot campfire :-)

[petgoat]

100. It's a Raging Inferno, LOL! n/t

I once tried to use the example of a kerosene heater to a bunch of
vernacular types. My argument that since a steel kerosene heater
doesn't melt itself therefore the WTC shouldn't have either didn't work
for them.

[janedoe]

102. Melting Airplane Engines

Like your kerosene heater, I use airplane engines to demonstrate that airplane fuel doesn't melt the airplane engine when it burns.

You're right with steel kerosene heaters. The house may burn down, but the heater is fine. Perhaps this is equivalent to tossing the kerosene heater into the wood stove.

Another example I like is to have someone make an el cheapo grill out of old coat hangers that will barely support a pot of water over a campfire. Start the fire and see what happens. Does the metal sag or does it explode and exhibit signs of a brittle failure?

[mikelewis]

131. It depends on what nationality starts the fire, of course...

There're so many other factors too, like what day of the week or whether or not Venus is rising or laying flat. Now if everything is just right, the metal shatters into dust and knocks over campfires acrros the street that weren't even lit on fire yet.

[janedoe]

132. It's not what nationality starts the fire, silly.

It's what nationality is ACCUSED of starting the fire. :-)

[hack89]

4. Nonsense

That myth has been debunked many time over - what you will have us believe is that you can pour thousands of gallons of fuel on office spaces that are packed with flammable materials and none of them caught fire. There are thousands of arsonist that would tell you that gas is a great accelerant for starting catastrophic fires.

[pox americana]

6. You don't know much about office buidlings, do you?

1. They are built and furnished with fireproof and fire retardant materials like gypsum, concrete, and metal, and

2. They are required to have automatic sprinkler systems, which were operating in the WTC towers.

[LARED]

8. You don't know much about sprinkler systems do you

From the FEMA report.

Damage caused by the aircraft impacts is believed to have disrupted the sprinkler and fire standpipe systems, preventing effective operation of either the manual or automatic suppression systems. Even if these systems had not been compromised by the impacts, they would likely have been ineffective. It is believed that the initial flash fires of jet fuel would have opened so many sprinkler heads that the systems would have quickly depressurized and been unable to effectively deliver water to the large area of fire involvement

This is absolutely true. Sprinkler systems are designed to operate in a limited area. It is not assumed that huge fire will instantly manifest themselves in a building.

[pox americana]

11. I know enough to see that FEMA is lying, as usual.

The "systems would have quickly depressurized." Right. This is New York City, not Tupelo, FEMA insinuations to the contrary, and unless it was a very poorly designed system, which is doubtful, it would have had the capacity to knock down fires on several floors at once without becoming "compromised."

More fake science for the easily fooled, and I'm not.

[LARED]

17. You really should do some research before responding

http://wtc.nist.gov/pubs/NISTNCSTAR1Draft.pdf

The fire safety systems (sprinklers, smoke purge, and fire alarms,) were designed to meet or exceed current practice. However, they played no role in the safety of life on September 11 because the water supplies to the sprinklers were fed by a single supply pipe that was damaged by the aircraft impact

..........................

In addition to these methods of passive fire protection, there were components that would be activated in the event of a fire. Automatic sprinklers had been installed on all of the roughly 40,000 ft2-sized floors, capable of controlling local fires totaling an aggregate floor area of up to 4500 ft2.

I know you're going to tell me that the NIST is lying as usual, but why not do a little research on how sprinkler systems are designed, before spouting off nonsense.

A few moments of critical thought would reveal the truth of the NIST statements. If you are tasked with designing a sprinkler system you must decide what demand will be put on that design. i.e. how big will the fire be and what is the max area the system will protect.

[pox americana]

18. Speaking of critical thinking, the reports you keep citing are unreliable,

unsupported, and unscientific. That's been demonstrated many times, but go ahead and keep citing them, or Popular Mechanics, or Dr. Eagar, or whatever font of disinformation you feel like dipping into.

[LARED]

19. The bottom line is that the sprinkler systems were not

capable of mitigating the fires and you probably know this, as it is common sense, not requiring a fire engineering degree; but you have the freedom to bury your head in the sand for as long as you like.

Enjoy the view.

[janedoe]

20. Isn't it ironic

that "common sense" isn't all that common. :-)

[LARED]

21. Ironic wasn't the word I had in mind

Per pox americana

it would have had the capacity to knock down fires on several floors at once without becoming "compromised."

Is it safe to assume you believe this is true?

[pox americana]

22. Until you show me the system specifications

I have no reason to believe it isn't. They should be very easy to find. Good luck.

p.s. surmises and insinutations are not specifications.

[LARED]

24. Sorry, I'm not doing your homework for you

Sprinkler protection requirements should be fairly easy to locate. Try the NIST, American Fire Sprinkler Assoc, or the NFPA, as they are good starting points.

I know some of these organizations are associated with the government, hence completely unreliable and tainted in your view, but the reality of it is that they are the organizations that have the resources to do this work in a comprehensive way.

[pox americana]

27. Standards are not specifications.

But you knew that. :)

[LARED]

28. Well, that true, but is there a point in telling us this?

Does this qualify as a spec in your opinion.

From the NIST report

Sprinklers shall be capable of controlling local fires totaling an aggregate floor area of up to 4500 ft2.

[pox americana]

29. You're telling me you don't know the difference

between specs and standards? You don't know what buckling is, you don't know what bending is, you can't tell WTC 5 from WTC 7, and I'm supposed to believe you know anything about structures?

[LARED]

30. Wow, did you make all that up yourself

or did you have help?

[pox americana]

35. I don't make stuff up, and I had lots of help.

That's why I'm here.

[AZCat]

37. The specs aren't what you want either

You want the submittals (or as-builts, if they exist).

But you knew that. :)

[pox americana]

41. Yes, they are.

Have you guys ever been anywhere near a project?

[AZCat]

43. Actually, I write specs all the time.

But since it's only my day job, maybe I don't know what the heck I'm talking about. Maybe I'm wrong that the specs aren't necessarily how the building is built, because the contractor (that's the guy in the field) is the one who chooses how to build the building. Sure, the guy with the stamp gets to veto bad decisions, but if the contractor prefers to do it differently than originally called for in the plans and specs (and his way doesn't change the performance of the building) then the registered architect or engineer will usually grant approval. Of course, this doesn't appear in the specs - it would only show up in the submittals (submitted AFTER approval of the original plans) or in "as-builts".

But hey - maybe they do things differently where you are. What building codes have you designed under? Perhaps we could discuss the intricacies of the ICC code development process? I would love to hear your insights on the whole ventilation air issue - our code inspectors are giving us hell.

[pox americana]

44. Ahem, we're talking about NYC, not the O K Corral.

Specs are not suggestions.

[AZCat]

45. Doesn't matter

The designers of a structure can't possibly anticipate every eventuality, thus the inherent flexibility of the specifications. Yes, they are not "suggestions", but neither are they truly representative of the finished structure. If I (as the designer) specify a particular piece of equipment for a building, the contractor certainly is welcome to suggest alternatives. If I accept his replacement, the change to the design would not show up in the specifications.

[pox americana]

46. Sure. But we're talking about a fire sprinkler system.

For the purpose of this discussion, such substitutions aren't really relevant, because it's the performance specifications that matter. Specifications are legal documents and it's an actionable crime if a contractor fail to build to them.

[mikelewis]

48. Actually, that's not entirely correct

I don't know who they talked to but that's not correct. A Sprinkler system in high rise is designed to allow for all out operation for roughly a half hour. This varies by state and local areas but 30 minutes is the rule of thumb. For them to say that shows that they are talking to the wrong people. BTW I am NFPA Certified Level 2 for fire alarm installations in Ohio. I don't put in a lot of fire systems but I know how. I also know that's a ridiculously uneducated statement.

[pox americana]

49. very helpful!

thanks :thumbsup:

[LARED]

54. What does all out operation mean?

Sprinkler systems are designed to operate within a defined square footage or number of heads opening at the same time. To cover say 40,000 square feet, how many heads are required and what size standpipe would be needed to supply water? Get my point?

As a certified level 2 installer, how many heads is a system typically designed to operate simultaneously?

Thanks for your help

[mikelewis]

63. All of them...

A sprinkler system is designed for all out operation for 30 minutes at a certain PSI. I don't design the systems so I don't remember the specs off hand, I just install water flow alarms to alert the security panel if one should either go off or fail. If the PSI drops in the pipes or increases to a certain threshhold, this would also trigger a trouble signal. That's another odd thing, the monitoring station should have been able to tell NIST exactly which flow control valves failed and when. Clearly some of them were working as there were reports of water in the stairwells but for some reason, they claim that they have no idea which parts of the system failed to operate. Each flow control nozzle is supervised, meaning when it begins squirting water or fails, it registers an alarm. Even with the system on full test, the signal would still have been transmitted either via landline or radio/cell backup. Each failure would have resulted in an instantanous tranmission of an alarm trouble signal. For them to claim that they have no idea what failed means that they are not talking to the right people. I could look at the history log from that morning and tell you exactly which systems failed and when.

Here's how the sprinkler system works in a high rise building. Every square inch of building space should be covered with a standard commercial flow control sprinkler valve that would not necessarily douse the fire but allow for enough time to offer a chance for the occupants to escape. This is roughly 30 minutes worth of operation before the resevoirs give out and the PSI drops to the point that they cannot operate effectively. A sprinkler system doesn't necessarily deluge an area with a flood of water, it's a spray, something like a garden hose nozel. When a heat detector in the sprinkler head reaches the activation point (and this varies depending on operating environments), the sprinkler valve opens and allows the water to come out in that area. The water flows from either the main water line or a raised resevior system depending on the PSI needed to get the proper coverage. A sensor located on the valve is nothing more than a pressure guage that determines whether or not the system has enough PSI to operate. These sensors are connected to a central control panel that monitors the status of each and every flow control sensor in the system. Each one is fully supervised and would instantly report a problem whether or not the system was in test or not. When a system is in test, the signals are still transmitted but the monitoring station just ignores them. The control panel would also have a log of each failure but I would assume that it was lost in the collapse.

Unless the panel was completely disabled and the backup disabled as well, the monitoring station should have a log. Now if the NIST doesn't have a log because the panel and backup were disabled, someone needs to go to jail. It's highly unusual to shut down an entire system unless there is a complete failure and in these types of systems that is highly unlikely. Each floor or set of floors would have had it's own control panel so shutting down the entire system makes absolutely no sense. I asked a few people at work about that and everyone agreed that it was very odd for an entire complex to be offline. I think "that's bullshit" was the most common reply. It's just not done, no one would want to take the risk of a fire breaking out and the signal not reaching the Fire Department.

If this is incoherent and rambling, forgive me, I just finished a rough day at work. If you have more specific questions about sprinkler systems I can get you that information though it may take a bit of time. What I do does not require a lot of engineering. They tell me the type of sensors to put in and I run the wire and hook up the panel. I have to know the theory but that's usually for certification tests so I have forgotten a whole lot. Usually, we have a contract plumber run the pipes and then we screw in the nozzles and tie in the alarm wires. It's really rather easy just time consuming and I really don't enjoy doing it.

[LARED]

64. Thanks for your response

You post was clear and helps me make my point.

A sprinkler system is designed for all out operation for 30 minutes at a certain PSI.

There is a fundamental premise to "all out operation". Let me explain what I mean. The sprinkle systems is designed based on a worst case criteria for the size of a fire. THe type of structure, its use, and construction ditate the design conditions. The designer will size the water supply and pressure for only "X" number of sprinkler opening at the same time for a given area. As an example if every sprinkler head opened at the same time on ten floors there would be a massive water flow. System pressure would drop quickly and the water supply would never last 30 minutes.

The point the NIST is making is that given the size of the fire, the sprinkler system would not have been effective. Keep in mind the piping distribution system being broken in multiple places surely removed orifices from the system, hence decreasing the pressure even more.


Here's how the sprinkler system works in a high rise building. Every square inch of building space should be covered with a standard commercial flow control sprinkler valve that would not necessarily douse the fire but allow for enough time to offer a chance for the occupants to escape. This is roughly 30 minutes worth of operation before the resevoirs give out and the PSI drops to the point that they cannot operate effectively.

You're making the point the the sprinkler system is designed to protect people, not necessarily the building. This strengthens the NIST position that the sprinkler system did little to protect the building for fire damage.

Regarding your comments about the panels, Yes My understanding is that is exactly how they work. But in order to get useful historical information, they must survive the collapse. An unlikely possibility.

[mikelewis]

67. That's not correct...

They do not design a system based upon available water supplies, they design the water delivery system to ensure that enough water is available to provide 30 minutes of all out sprinklers and 2 hours of Stand pipe usage. If the water supply isn't available, they have to make it available by piping in another Fireline. A single fireline is capable of pumping 3,500 gallons per minute. They have to run as many firelines as it takes to meet code. Keep in mind, these are the minimum times required. No one designs a fire system to work only for the minimum time. These systems can operate for hours and hours and can even divert water from the main lines if needed for continued usage. To say that they would not have been able to maintain operation is just ridiculous and ignores the regulations.

A sprinkler system must be able to have all heads showering for a total of 30 minutes. These systems are capable of delivering thousands of gallons of water per minute throughout the entire system. When you test a newly installed system, all sprinklers are required to maintain a certain level of operation for at least 30 minutes or they do not pass inspection. Some places require shorter times but not by much; this is all of the heads going all at once. You’re repeating what the NIST was saying and that's incorrect. To say that the sprinklers would have been unable to operate because of the number of heads going off at once is simply retarded. I'm not calling you retarded, just the guy who printed this crap in the first place. I don't blame you for believing it but think about a logical design for a fire suppression system. Would it seem logical to only allow for a few heads to operate when there have been many instances where multiple floors have been engulfed in flames?

It may very well be the cases that they designed their systems to only operate a few heads at a time but that's against every code that I have ever come across. Also, if the insurance companies had proof that this was the case, the fire company would most likely get sued. You can't do that unless you want to get sued when the place burns to the ground. Holy shit, if I even suggested something like that I'd probably get fired and deservedly so.

Sprinkler systems are pretty effective in protecting buildings but they are primarily for allowing for a safe egress out of the building. The water slows down the spread of the fire and allows time for people to get out safely and the fire department to arrive. They are pretty effective against low rated fires but would not have had much success in extinguishing the WTC fires, this is true. The damage to the piping systems and the intensity of the blaze would have been too much for the sprinklers to overcome by themselves. However, they would have suppressed the fire and prevented the spread of the fire a great deal regardless of the fire rating. In addition, they would have served to cool the fires as well which is a huge help when fire fighters show up and tap into the the standpipes. To say that the sprinklers offered little assistance in combating the blaze is simply false. The sprinklers would have helped suppress the fires and control the spread of the flames until the fire department arrived to eliminate the fire altogether. The sprinklers probably were not operational in the impact area but everywhere else, they would have been more than enough to control the fire.

Also, a sprinkler system is designed to handle a ruptured line. When a line ruptures, the drop in pressure usually results in an automatic shut off of that line, not the entire system. Some systems can sense the location of the break and shut off the water throughout the line though I doubt that was the case for the WTC complex based on the year it was built. It's my understanding they were in the process of upgrading the system so they may have upgraded the sprinklers as well, who knows.

The survival of the panel is irrelevant to the historical data. A fire system is required to have at least two means of communicating alarm and trouble conditions to a remote monitoring station, either an approved U.L. Central Station or sometimes the signal goes directly to the fire station. In many large commercial buildings, radio/cellular backup is required to augment the system in case the land lines go down. We know this backup was not necessary since the phones in the building were working but it was probably required. According to reports, the fire system was put on test around 6 something in the morning. All "putting a system on test" does is flags the account ND (No Dispatch), otherwise, it operates exactly the same as if it were in normal operation. All signals would have been sent to the monitoring station and recorded on the computer systems as an account history. Those signals received would not have resulted in any action by the monitoring station but would have been stored in their computer as a history. The panels irrelevant once the signal is sent. A signal must transmit to the central station within 90 seconds of a trouble condition or the system fails inspection.

Putting a system on test is a different than disabling a systems communication capabilities or shutting it off completely. Putting the entire building on test would be completely stupid and unnecessary. The installer/technician would only need to shut down one area at a time to work on it and shutting down the total system serves no practical purpose and is potentially reckless. Putting the entire building on test opens the installation/service company to a potential lawsuit. You'd find very few who would agree to do this unless there were some very, very good reason for it. You really don't understand how big of a deal this is but it is a huge deal. If a company got caught doing something like this without a damn good reason, they would lose their license. This is no joke. This disregard for proper procedures could have potentially exposed the security company to a lawsuit.

The fire alarm system would also have been a tool for the fire department in combating the fires. The fire alarm system would tell them exactly where the fires were at and when they started. The first thing they would do is send someone to check the log of the fire panel and determine which areas were in alarm. That's not only procedure, it’s common sense. A fire chief would never send his people in blind unless he absolutely had to.

I appreciate your attempt to explain what the NIST is saying but you are completely wrong and misinformed. I urge you to call any fire installation company and ask them if what I say is true or not. Ask them what happens when a sprinkler system loses pressure. Ask them what happens when 3 or 4 entire floors are engulfed in flames, would only a few sprinkler heads work? This assertion is simply false and has no basis in fact whatsoever.

The standards listed above come from several sources.

NFPA 24, Standard for the Installation of Private Fire
Service Mains and Their Appurtenances.

NFPA 20, Standard for the Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps.

NFPA 14, Standard for the Installation of Standpipe and Hose
Systems.

NFPA 13, Standard for the Installation of Sprinklers.

NFPA 72, Standard for the Installation of fire alarm systems

NFPA 25, Standard for the Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water Based Fire Protection Systems.

Unfortunately, there are no free links to these books online. Each book costs a shitload of money, some cost hundreds of dollars though I believe that's bullshit. If we have to follow these standards, they should be available at reasonable prices. To buy them all would cost over a thousand dollars and believe me, no one even reads them unless they are trying to pass a test. After the test, we go back to the real world where we install systems that work and work well beyond what is called for in these standards. Every system I have seen has operated at least 150 percent above these standards. No one wants to be the fire alarm company that failed; its bad business and bad ethics. I highly doubt that the people they got to install and maintain that system had either character flaw.

[LARED]

68. A question

Do you believe that the fire sprinkler system in the WTC was designed to operate all sprinklers on all floors for a full thirty minutes?

Edit to clarify

There is a specified water demand that the supply must meet. When designing a fire protection system, there are assumptions made as to how large a fire will be, and how many sprinklers will operate simultaneously to meet that demand. Knowing how many sprinkler will be operating provides the designer with information as to how big the supply system must be.

[mikelewis]

69. Yes

The entire building should have been rigged for all out operation for 30 minutes. I have no idea if the did in fact build it this way but they should have. To get a reasonable coverage for a sprinkler, each head only needs to deliver roughly 15 gpm (gallons per minute), this would deliver a spray of .5 gpm on the protected areas and the spacing should be roughly about 18 feet apart depending on the designed coverage area. A fireline and a pump can deliver over 3000 gpm. Just a rough guess, they could get away with one delivery pipe and pump per 2 floors. They may have spaced them out every 4 floors but I would need to know the dimensions of the coverage area to tell you for sure. From your question, I assume you're thinking of one complete system delivering water to all floors at the same time. This isn't how they work. What you have in a high rise is several smaller systems working on several different floors all at the same time.


Do you believe they would design a system that would fail if 2 floors caught on fire, or 3 floors or 10 floors? How many floors would they decide didn't need a functioning sprinkler system? It makes absolutely no sense for the NIST to claim that the system wouldn't be capable of delivering the water to 10 to 20 floors. No one would waste time installing a system that wasn't capable of doing this. It would be a complete waste of time and money.

[LARED]

70. I have an older copy of NFPA 13 at work

and I'll check it on Monday about what they say about water demand.

But keep in mind based on your numbers each tower would require a supply system capable of delivering somewhere around 2.5 million GPM for thirty minutes.

Do you believe they would design a system that would fail if 2 floors caught on fire, or 3 floors or 10 floors? How many floors would they decide didn't need a functioning sprinkler system? It makes absolutely no sense for the NIST to claim that the system wouldn't be capable of delivering the water to 10 to 20 floors.

The point of sprinkler systems is to allow people to escape and allow time for fire fighting to start. There was no reason to assume five or ten floors would catch fire at the same time. As a fire spreads the people are long gone.

[mikelewis]

78. I'm not disputing your estimate, I just wonder where you derived this...

amount of 2.5 million gallons. Each sprinkler can pump roughly 18 gpm and I doubt there were more than 50 to 60 sprinklers on each floor. I have no idea what the size of the floor is but 50 to 60 sprinklers is huge. At max, the system had to deliver 1,080 gpm to each floor so a dedicated fire line could supply up to 3 floors without breaking a sweat. Since there were 110 floors, you would need roughly 36 firelines to deliver enough water to douse the buidling indefinitely or at least until the city ran out of water. A fireline capable of delivering 3500 gpm is only a 12" pipe. Not all of the pipes would need to reach the top of the building and the citerns would more than make up for any failures if they went to a 4 or 5 per floor design.

[Make7]

71. What do you make of this?

   2.1.3.2 Suppression
   When originally constructed, the two towers were not provided with automatic fire sprinkler protection. However, such protection was installed as a retrofit circa 1990, and automatic sprinklers covered nearly 100 percent of WTC 1 and WTC 2 at the time of the September 11 attacks. In addition, each building had standpipes running through each of its three stairways. A 1.5-inch hose line and a cabinet containing two airpressurized water (APW) extinguishers were also present at each floor in each stairway.

   The primary water supply was provided by a dedicated fire yard main that looped around most of the complex. This yard main was supplied directly from the municipal water supply. Two remotely located highpressure, multi-stage, 750-gallons per minute (gpm) electrical fire pumps took suction from the New York City municipal water supply and produced the required operating pressures for the yard main.

   Each tower had three electrical fire pumps that provided additional pressure for the standpipes. One pump, located on the 7th floor, received the discharge from the yard main fire pumps and moved it up to the 41st floor, where a second 750-gpm fire pump pushed it up to a third pump on the 75th floor. Each fire pump produced sufficient pressure to supply water to the pump two stages up from it in the event that any one pump should fail.

   Several 5,000-gallon storage tanks, filled from the domestic water system, provided a secondary water supply. Tanks on the 41st, 75th, and 110th floors provided water directly to a standpipe system. A tank on the 20th floor supplied water directly to the yard main. Numerous Fire Department of New York (FDNY) connections were located around the complex to allow the fire department to boost water pressure in the buildings.

http://www.house.gov/science/hot/wtc/wtc-report/WTC_ch2.pdf

[pox americana]

72. It means mikelewis is right and the FEMA/NIST reports are horseshit.

But we knew that.

[LARED]

73. Can you elaborate on that?

As what mikelewis is saying and the information make7 provided seems to be in conflict.

[pox americana]

74. I could, but I'm not going to belabor the obvious.

But we could start with the multiple supply lines, pumps, tanks, and backup delivery systems.

[LARED]

75. Translated as

I've no clue.

[pox americana]

76. Clue: "multiple supply lines, pumps, tanks, and backup delivery systems."

Sound each word out slowly.

[LARED]

77. Slowly sound out the words

"I am entirely missing the point," then slap your forehead and say duh!!!!!

No one is even discussing whether there are supply lines, pumps, tanks and back up delivery systems. The issues is how large those were and if it is possible they properly functioned on 9/11.

mikelewis seems to believe the supply systems are supposed to have the capacity to supply the entire sprinkler demand if every sprinkler in the entire building was activated. The other side is saying the supply systems are only designed to provide water for a limit areas that are defined by how large a fire is anticipated.

[pox americana]

81. "The other side"? You mean the Bush-Cheney noise machine?

The side you keep telling whoppers to defend?

No, I'm not missing the point.

[LARED]

82. No, the other side are those that read AND comprehend (n/t)

[mikelewis]

79. The nature of a fire sprinkler system...

When I went through my training the most interesting thing I got out of it was the way fire spreads in a room. I had assumed that fire spreads from object to object, radiating out from the starting point. In an enclosed space, this is not correct. Fire spreads through a room from the top down. The heat from a fire rises to the ceiling and superheats the air to the point that anything combustible begins to burn. If a lamp in one corner of the room catches fire, you would assume that the table it's sitting on would catch fire next but in reality, the next thing to catch fire may be the drapes on the other side of the room. I was sort of shocked by this realization but truthfully I had never thought about it before.

When you understand this principle, you begin to understand the mechanics of a sprinkler system. Sprinkler system are not designed to simply put out the fire, they are designed to cool the air and suppress the spread of the fire. If a fire breaks out in one section, the heat rises and opens a heat sensor in that area and sets off the sprinklers. A heat sensor is something like a thermostat in a car. When the coil gets hot it begins to expand. Once it expands to a certain point it either mechanically opens a trigger valve or does it electronically. Either way, the water starts shooting out in a mist to rapidly cool the air and slow the fire. It's also important to understand that it's not just one sprinkler that goes off. When one heat sensor goes off, all the other sprinklers in that compartment go off at the same time.

Now since we know that it's the super heated air that starts the fire, the greatest threat is that the floor above will catch fire as well. If the heat should slip past the sprinkler cover and find it's way between the floors or worse between several floors, a sprinkler system has to be able to adapt to this situation. You have to have enough water to cool the air on any level that the fire should reach. Why would you design a system that fails to address the nature of fire? If a fire starts jumping floors, they have to be able to supply enough water to suppress it no matter where it starts or how intense it is.

Sprinklers have been very effective in supressing the spread of fire and since they slow it down so much, it gives people a chance to escape. Because of this, the NFPA suggests that every floor has to be able to effectively supress the fire long enough to allow people to escape and fire fighters to enter and begin to combat the fire. The NIST's assertion that the 10 or so floors that were damaged would have rendered the sprinkler system obsolete is just ridiculous. You have to understand this. It's like saying you'd design a space ship that would only fly 3/4 of the way to it's destination. It's blatenly ignorant of the nature of a sprinkler system.

No matter what you believe about the accuracy of the NIST, you have to understand that they are wrong about this statement. They are telling you that 2 + 2 = 3. Whoever is telling them this information is wrong, dead wrong. I wish I could prove it to you but you'll just have to investigate on your own. I don't know the specifactions of the sprinkler system and that limits my ability to prove it to you conclusively. And it's actually irrelevant whether or not the building could sustain all out operation for 30 minutes because it would not have had to do this on 9/11. Only 10% to 15% of the building was on fire at the time, so only 10% to 15% had to operate as intended to supress the fire. It would not have failed unless all the lines feeding it failed as well and that's very unlikely. Those lines come up the core of the building and are well protected and redundant. You could never convince me anything but a missile could have pentrated the core of that building and severed the lines. Maybe heat could have weakened the core and caused the collapse {I wouldn't believe either} but the planes never could have pierced all that steel. In all probability, those lines survived and the sprinklers that were not destroyed saved countless lives. If they were not there, no one could have escaped the building above the impact area after a few minutes.

[mikelewis]

80. Causes of failure...

This is a good article on Sprinkler systems.
-Snippet-

"Sprinkler systems are designed to deliver sufficient water flow to the system based on the level of fire hazard for that occupancy. An inadequate supply of water to meet the design conditions can seriously reduce the effectiveness of the system to the point where failure can occur. "

This is true, improper planning or improper coverage can cause a sprinkler system to fail. However:

"Canadian building regulations currently require that sprinkler systems be designed and installed in conformance with standards published by the National Fire Protection Association. Systems designed to such standards should not fail as a result of inadequate water supply since this is specified as part of the sprinkler system design."

Since the Sprinklers were installed sometime circa 1990, they would have conformed to NFPA regulations and codes. The codes have changed over the years but not signifigantly. The one thing you can bank on is that there would be plenty of water available for operation in the areas not damaged by the plane impact.
-------------------------------

"The three principal sources of statistics on sprinkler performance indicate that sprinklers provide satisfactory performance in 96 to 99% of fire occurrences. While these figures show a remarkably high success rate, the reported causes of failure indicate that the performance of sprinkler systems can be improved if measures are taken to avoid what are considered to be preventable failures."


----------------------------------
http://irc.nrc-cnrc.gc.ca/cbd/cbd238e.html

[Make7]

88. FIREFIGHTER WILLIAM GREEN

WORLD TRADE CENTER TASK FORCE INTERVIEW
FIREFIGHTER WILLIAM GREEN
Interview Date: December 26, 2001
____________________

Q. You were taking the hose up. Did you get the impression the idea was like you were going to fight the fire or what?

A. We were going to put the fire out.

Q. You were going to put the fire out. Okay.

A. Even like in hindsight I'm thinking now the standpipe must have been compromised. That first ten stories, the water was falling down like rapids, ankle deep. You get tunnel vision, I guess.

(page 29)

http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/20050812_WTC_GRAPHIC/9110392.PDF

-Make7

[pox americana]

90. Let's see, "the water was falling down like rapids, ankle deep."

Water was going up, and then it was coming down. The system was operating.

And the "like in hindsight I'm thinking now" statement shows that he's been coached, as these firefighters all were.

[mikelewis]

93. I don't believe it was coached at all...

There are a lot of potable water pipes that fed those floors, bathrooms, kitches and drinking fountains require a lot of water. Also, it's guaranteed that several connection and sprinkler systems were destroyed by the impact and these would release even more water. But it would not have taken out the entire system nor would the system have failed due to the amount of sprinklers operating at the same time.

The firefighter simply stated his opinion and a real fear they must have had. If the planes had breached the core of the building and severed the supply pipes, dousing the flames would have been almost impossible. They would have had to let the building burn out. They also had to be very concerned about the people trapped above the fires. Without a functional suppression system, those people probably wouldn't make it out safely. With the compartmentalization, the fire may have been contained but when you're slugging up 80 floors to fight a fire and rescue people, watching all that water pour down the steps had to have been frightening.

And you are right about the system operating. That is clear proof that the system was pumping water. If the core pipes were compromised, the water would have shut off immediately because of the loss of pressure. This is a clear indication that the some of the leads off the main pipes had been damaged and many of the potable water pipes as well.

[mikelewis]

92. The pipes that lead to the floors are in core....

A standpipe is where the fire department makes thier connection with the hoses. This could very well have been compromised and probably was. The main lines however would have been protected by the core of the building, not because they were concerned with planes flying into them but because the only way to bring up that much water in a retrofit would be to pipe it right up the middle of the building and anchor the pipes to the riser beams. It's the only place you can reliably attach the pipes without worrying about a major construction project and any future remodeling. Hitting one or two stand pipes would release about 750 gpm per connection but would not disable the entire system. Also, keep in mind, there are lots of pipes in that system and reserve tanks up above the areas of impact. The torrent of water could also have been the main water supply to the building for those floors which would have no impact on the fire system whatsoever. They are two completely separate systems.

From Lared's post above, the NIST stated this:

"Damage caused by the aircraft impacts is believed to have disrupted the sprinkler and fire standpipe systems, preventing effective operation of either the manual or automatic suppression systems. Even if these systems had not been compromised by the impacts, they would likely have been ineffective. It is believed that the initial flash fires of jet fuel would have opened so many sprinkler heads that the systems would have quickly depressurized and been unable to effectively deliver water to the large area of fire involvement "

The first part is possible but not for the other areas of the building, only those areas hit would have been affected. The second part is completely incorrect. This statement shows that they have no idea about how a sprinkler system is designed to operate. The system would not have failed when the sprinkler heads turned on unless the lines leading to them were destroyed. For those lines to have been destroyed, the designer would have had them places outside the core risers and this is just plain nonsense. There's no practical way to do it without increasing the cost of installation by a factor of 3. A system of this nature would already cost millions of dollars, there's no way any contractor would even suggest the type of installation where they didn't go right up the center. It makes no sense.

[Make7]

110. The reason I posted the Firefighter interview....

was not to prove whether or not the fire suppression system was capable of operating throughout the building simultaneously. I just found it interesting that a Firefighter thought that he wouldn't have been able to fight the fires because the infrastructure was likely compromised.

What I don't know is if firefighters are required to have a significant amount of knowledge of how the water delivery systems are designed and installed, but I do assume they know something about the subject.

You are correct that the water he saw when going up the stairs may not have had anything to do with the fire suppression water supply - I think it was more of a "connecting the dots" thing for him. If there are problems with the water supply down at this level, it's probably not functioning properly at the impact area.
____________________

Regarding the NIST statement:

There was an unknown amount of damage in the core area. All the stairwells in the North Tower were impassable, it is possible that much of the fire suppression water delivery infrastructure in the impact zone was damaged. This would make the sprinkler system ineffective for many areas above the impact zone.

But whether that is true or not, for the part you highlighted, they may have been basing that on the available information they had on how the system was designed and installed. If they were getting the same info as what was in this FEMA report, it does seem to make some sense. Although you may very well be correct that they are using bad information.

-Make7

[LARED]

83. mikelewis; please review these links and

tell me what you make of them. Specifically the remote area and hydraulic demand

http://www.usace.army.mil/inet/usace-docs/eng-manuals/em1110-3-166/a-a.pdf

http://www.nfpa.org/categoryList.asp?categoryID=714&URL=Publications/NFPA%20Journal®/November%20/%20December%202003/Features#1

Function of the remote area
The function of the remote area is to reflect the maximum system demand for water flow in gallons per minute (gpm) and water pressure in pounds per square inch (psi) created by a specific sprinkler system layout for a given design basis. The remote area must present the largest hydraulic demand in the portion of a building covered by its design basis. Designers ignore portions of the building with different design bases until they locate their remote areas.


http://www.rfbpe.com/SprinklerDesignPolicyRev2.pdf

Thanks

[pox americana]

84. Google isn't going to restore your credibility or Bush's

so you might as well hang it up.

[LARED]

85. Let me guess

you're vying for troll of the week award?

[mikelewis]

86. I'm not sure what your asking...

In response to the Army Corps Specs...
The specs for the sprinkler systems are not for high rise commerical buildings. This looks like a complex of 1 to 4 story buildings that is upgrading it's sprinkler system. These all appear to be light hazard buildings with basic sprinkler systems designed to cover high risk areas in some and total coverage in others. It's quite a bit different than supplying a high rise. But one thing you should take note of from these specifications is the time that they state the system should operate. It's always required that the systems provide for a specific time of operation. Also, when they are designing this system, notice how they threat each area seperately in the design. That's how they attack a high rise. The compartmentalize the system and figure out the water flow requirements for each section and establish a flow time. I have never heard of anyone configuring a system to fail. If the WTC buildings were designed for 100% coverage then 100% of the building has to be able to operate for whatever time they have specified.


About the "Functioning of Remote Areas"...
This addresses the problems in piping pressures to the farthest points of the sprinkler system. This is especially difficult in a dry system but maintaining the pressure in a wet system can be equally tricky. All this is saying is that modeling a system requires more than a simple computer model or rough calculations. A lot of designers work backwards from the farthest point and determine the PSI requirements that way. This article tells designers to model off the design requirements and not the number of sprinkler heads or computer models so that the system can properly supply water to each head as it was designed.



The last one seems to be the standards for inspections. When you do an inspection, they have to have all the information on file of how the system is designed to operate so they can test it properly.

I'm not sure where you're going with this other than maybe testing my general knowledge of sprinkler systems. What you have to understand is that each system serves a different purpose and requires a different design. Some systems are installed for a specific area and some are for total coverage. It all depends on what the person who ordered it wants to do. Sometimes, you can't provide total coverage and have to live with what you got. Maybe the designers of the WTC sprinkler systems didn't design it properly and it failed to provide 100% coverage. If they cut corners and only figured they would need to cover certain portions of the buildings at certain times, they were taking a huge risk. If the designs called for 100% coverage that's what they should have gotten. To say a system fails because another section of the system is operating is one sure fire way of landing in court with a huge lawsuit. If a sprinkler head is squirting water, it must continue to squirt water until the specified time has elapsed regardless of anything else that may be going on. Systems do fail but the NIST is saying that the system was designed to fail and that's rubbish. They don't design them to fail. That's insane.

[LARED]

95. This is where we disagree

If the WTC buildings were designed for 100% coverage then 100% of the building has to be able to operate for whatever time they have specified.

After perusing NFPA13 it is clear to me this is not true. Part of the design process is to determine the area of application. It makes no sense to provide water to all 110 floors over ever square foot of sprinkled area. There is no possibility the building will spontaneously catch fire over that much area.

If you used 0.15 gpm per sqft, you have 110 floors at 40,000 sqft per floor gives over 500,000 GPM. Where is the city going to get 500,000 gpm for thirty minutes without losing pressure? Nowhere!

The NIST is stating the fire protection system was not designed to fight a fire as large as the one on 9/11, the supply system was damages and ultimately the fire system did little to mitigate the fires. I agree.

Here's the schematic of the fire protection system.

[pox americana]

97. 2 systems, 4 supply lines, 5 pumps, and 6 5,000-gallon tanks

per building.

mike's point is amply illustrated even by FEMA/NIST's own highly suspect diagram. Next?

[LARED]

105. So how does

2 systems, 4 supply lines, 5 pumps, and 6 5,000-gallon tanks supply somewhere around 500,000 gallon per minute for thirty minutes?

[pox americana]

108. Show me the specs and I'll tell you.

The real specs, not a Popular Mechanics diagram.

[LARED]

111. What spec's are you looking for? (n/t)

[pox americana]

117. The system specifications, obviously. n/t

[LARED]

118. You think the system specs will tell you how

2 systems, 4 supply lines, 5 pumps, and 6 5,000-gallon tanks supply somewhere around 500,000 gallon per minute for thirty minutes?

Here's a little math problem I solved for you

NYC uses an average of 1.35 billion gallons of water per day (See here) So dividing by 24 and then 60 gives you a lttle under 1,000,000 gpm.

Knowing this and knowing you are defending the notion that the system specifications are going to tell you how the fire protection system in the world trade center was designed to use one half of the entire distribution capacity of NYC (500,000 gpm for thirty minutes) is a problem for you.

Do you really think having the system specifications will provide you with an answer suitable to you? Or will you continue to defend this notion?

[pox americana]

119. They'll show how much the system could deliver and for how long, yes,

among other things. Incidentally your assumptions and calculations are ridiculously inaccurate but I don't feel like wasting time explaining why.

[LARED]

121. Thank you for making my point. I agree they are inaccurate

I based my assumptions and calculations on mikelewis's stating the fire protection system requires that the all sprinklers be capable of operating at the same time and provide x gpm per sprinkler or gpm per sq-ft of office space.

My point all along was that designing a fire protection system to meet his standard was not possible, and that the NIST stating the fire protection systems was capable of mitigating a fire covering 4500 sq-ft seem correct.

So thank you for making my point. Nice to see you come around.

Regards

[pox americana]

122. If your point is that NIST is feeding baloney to fools, you're welcome.

Glad to help.

[LARED]

123. Another well reasoned reply, (n/t)

[MercutioATC]

126. LARED, you obviously don't know about the 15M gallon water tank at the WTC

1/2M gpm for 30 minutes? No problem...

:P

[Make7]

87. NFPA standards online.

For anyone interested, some NFPA standards can be viewed for free on their website:

http://www.nfpa.org/aboutthecodes/list_of_codes_and_standards.asp

Select one from the list then click the Preview this document link on the page for that document.

-Make7

[mikelewis]

89. Okay... if you go to Chapter 11 Section 2....

You'll see the rule of thumb I was talking about...

11.2.2.1 Shall be used in determining the minimum water supply requirements for light and ordinary hazard occupancies protected by systems with pipe sized according to the pipe schedules of Section 14.5


Duration in Light hazard 30-60 minutes
Duration in Ordinary hazard 60-90 minutes

I urge you to read this section and measure this against what the NIST has to say. I'm not saying they're lying, I'm saying thier terribly misinformed.

[Make7]

91. Past and present standards.

I don't have time to read it right now, but I'd like to ask you a couple of quick questions:

Does a building need to meet the requirements of the current standards if a sprinkler system is installed years after it has already been built? Or do they just need to meet the standards that were current when the building was first constructed?

And do you think there's a (not too difficult) way to find out what the standards were when the WTC systems were put in?

-Make7

[mikelewis]

94. They have to meet the current standards of when the sprinkler system...

was installed. The standards really don't change all that much. They make minor adjustments over the years to reflect new technology and correct any gaps in the coverage of the systems. They were recently changed in 2002, upgrading most of the requirements to reflect the increase in fire technology. The core principles haven't changed at all.

The sprinkler was installed around 1990 so the current regulations are going to be very similar, especially in regards to operation. Over the years, they develop new standards for inspection and allow certain methods to be used that have shown to be reliable but the concepts haven't changed at all, nor will they. Sprinkler systems work very well in all types of very difficult environments. They are reliable and have proven to save lives and property. The NFPA, while a pain in the ass to meet their standards, really do a fantastic job in ensuring that these systems do the job they're intended to do. Countless people owe them a debt of gratitude and to read something like this from the NIST is, quite frankly, insulting.

[Make7]

109. Thanks. ( n/t )

[petgoat]

124. Mike, I really appreciate you bringing your expertise to this forum

For instance, I knew instinctively that sprinkler systems would have
shutoff valves in case of loss of pressure--but who cares about my instincts?

[hack89]

13. A small electric short circuit started a blaze

that led to the partial collapse of the Madrid sky scraper - it was an office building wasn't it? It's sprinkler system didn't seem to be of much use.

[pox americana]

14. The Windsor building was concrete framed, burned 24 hrs, did not collapse,

and had no fire sprinkler system. Next?

http://www.iklimnet.com/hotelfires/windsor_madrid.html

[hack89]

23. But it was packed with flammable materials...

why wouldn't the contents of the WTC burn also? The construction method is irrelevant - we are talking about the contents.

[pox americana]

26. It was undergoing renovation

evidently, so it may have been full of flammable stuff like paint, lumber, scaffolding, and the all rest, but it would be different stuff than the WTC furnishings.

[hack89]

32. There was about 60 tons per floor of flammable material in the WTC...

that would create a big fire. Do you work in an office building - mine is crammed full of paper and other flammable stuff.

[pox americana]

34. That's why they had automatic sprinklers.

The Windsor building burned like a torch and the WTC buildings did not. I can think of several reasons why they didn't but the chief one is the sprinklers.

p.s. where did you get that statistic?

[hack89]

39. And how did the sprinklers survive the impact?

Don't you think perhaps the 767 that plowed through multiple floors would destroy most of the sprinkler heads and piping?

This minor detail of a 100 ton plane slamming into the building at high speed always seems to be forgotten when ever comparisons between Madrid and the WTC are made.

As for the fuel loading of the buildings, go here:

http://fire.nist.gov/bfrlpubs/fire96/PDF/f96080.pdf

you'll see that there was plenty of material to fuel large fires.

[pox americana]

42. Just like the rest of the structure did.

For one thing, they were designed to. Oh wait, Dr. Eagar said never to mention that. I meant, they were designed to instantly "pancake."

[hack89]

47. Your contention is not believable...

there is no sprinkler system that would survive such an impact. But we don't have to argue about it - the system was built in accordance with NY City fire and building codes. They would tell us if the system had to withstand such an impact. Now I looked and found nothing but please feel free to set me straight with a link or two if I am wrong. You sound so sure of yourself so it shouldn't be too much of a problem, should it?

[pox americana]

50. That doesn't make it any less true.

There's no law against magical thinking so you can believe whatever you like.

[hack89]

51. Interesting way to concede the point but thanks. n/t

[pox americana]

52. May I suggest the purchase of an English dictionary. n/t

[hack89]

53. When you respond to a reasoned statement..

with comments about magic, then it is clear you have nothing meaningful to say. It is the kind of retort I would expect from my seven year old.

[stickdog]

59. Sure.

Just look at all that wildly flammable material.

Not.

[hack89]

62. Read this .. do the math..

Then try to tell me there wasn't hundreds of tons of fuel in the impact zones.

http://fire.nist.gov/bfrlpubs/fire96/PDF/f96080.pdf

Your picture is nonsense - if that is the best you can do then you should give up. Where is your evidence that this office was in the impact zone? Where is your evidence that every floor in the WTC was identical to this room? One picture proves everything?

[stickdog]

66. Look at this, then get a clue.

There are tons of flammable "fuel" covering Death Valley as well, but the area doesn't seem to get too many raging forest fires, now does it?

The point is that offices have a lot less easy-to-ignite fuel than homes and high rise offices have less easy-to-ignite fuel than typical offices.

[mikelewis]

103. Actually, since the building was only 30% occupied at best...

the majority of the offices looked like this...

[petgoat]

104. 30% occupied?

Well, there goes the "nobody could have planted explosives without being seen" canard.

[LARED]

106. The WTC was only 30% occupied? At best?

Reference please.

[mikelewis]

112. Before I show you mine, you show me yours...

I'm just curious on just how many people you believe were in the building when the plane hit? I don't need a reference, just a guess.

[mikelewis]

113. And I just discovered that I was wrong, it wasn't 30%.. can you guess...

the right number? Would you expect it to be higher or lower?

[Make7]

114. I thought in your previous post you meant tenant occupancy.

As in amount of office space occupied by businesses.

Now in this post you seem to be speaking of how many occupants (individual people) were in the towers when the plane hit.

I fail to see how the number of people who did, or did not, show up for work on 9/11/01 would have anything but a negligible impact on the amount of combustible material in the building.

-Make7

[mikelewis]

115. How many tenants were there?

How many offices were rented out?

There is sort of a correlation to how many people showed up for work and how much space was being utilized in the building. Since the first plane hit at 8:46:30 a.m. I would expect the majority of the people who were going to work would already be there or in transit through the building when the first plane hit. Since the majority of the building was office space, I would assume that the ratio of tenants to people would be lower than the ratio of offices rented and actual tenants. This is ofcourse assuming that more than one person occupied an office at any given time. So what's you're best guess... how many actual tenants were in the trade center?

[Make7]

116. Two hundred eighty.

202 in the North Tower.
 78 in the South Tower.   (Source)
____________________

There were nine million square feet of office space in the towers. (Source) Here is the square footage of only the top 10 tenants:

Business                      Square Feet Leased
-------------------------------------------------
Morgan Stanley                  840,000
Empire Health Choice            461,000
Marsh USA                       361,000
Guy Carpenter                   320,000
Fiduciary Trust Company Intl.   245,156
Oppenheimer Funds, Inc.         231,000
Brown & Wood, L.L.P.            223,100
AON Corporation                 219,133
Fuji Bank                       182,956
Verizon Communications          155,490
---------------------------------------------------
TOTAL                         3,238,835
PERCENT OF AVAILABLE SPACE       35.99%

-Make7

[mikelewis]

128. How many people worked in the towers? You're best guess.

[Make7]

129. Thirty Seven Thousand Six Hundred Twenty Nine.

I can't wait to see where you're going with this.

[mikelewis]

130. And what are you basing this guess on?

This seems pretty exact, is this a guess or do you know?

[Make7]

134. The percentage of total available square footage of ...

... the World Trade Center complex that the Twin Towers represented and an estimate of how many people worked at the WTC complex. I added a small number to make it not look like a guess. (And just for fun.)

I don't think anyone knows the exact numbers involved. USA Today said about half the workers were there at the time of the first impact. I did an quick estimation and got 37%. You are saying it was 30% or less. (If I'm not mistaken.)

What difference does it make? I replied thinking you might explain why this seems to matter. Quite simply, I was curious. (Past tense.)

-Make7

[spooked911]

133. test

test

[sabbat hunter]

120. WTC

had its fireproof/retardant materials removed (ie asbestose)

[slaveplanet]

9. previous wtc fires

tend to support the fact that the buildings didn't collapse from a fire.

THE WORLD TRADE CENTER FIRES.

First you need to know that the north tower of the World Trade Center suffered a very serious fire on February 13, 1975. You also need to know that this fire caused no serious structural damage to the tower and that no steel-framed high-rise has ever collapsed due to fire. The following is a report concerning the February 13, 1975 fire.

The February 13, 1975 North Tower Fire.

The February 13, 1975 North Tower Fire has been carefully hidden from you. Here are a few reports concerning it.


This 110-story steel-framed office building suffered a fire on the 11th floor on February 13, 1975. The loss was estimated at over $2,000,000. The building is one of a pair of towers, 412 m in height. The fire started at approximately 11:45 P.M. in a furnished office on the 11th floor and spread through the corridors toward the main open office area. A porter saw flames under the door and sounded the alarm. It was later that the smoke detector in the air-conditioning plenum on the 11th floor was activated. The delay was probably because the air-conditioning system was turned off at night. The building engineers placed the ventilation system in the purge mode, to blow fresh air into the core area and to draw air from all the offices on the 11th floor so as to prevent further smoke spread. The fire department on arrival found a very intense fire. It was not immediately known that the fire was spreading vertically from floor to floor through openings in the floor slab. These 300-mm x 450-mm (12-in. x 18-in.) openings in the slab provided access for telephone cables. Subsidiary fires on the 9th to the 19th floors were discovered and readily extinguished. The only occupants of the building at the time of fire were cleaning and service personnel. They were evacuated without any fatalities. However, there were 125 firemen involved in fighting this fire and 28 sustained injuries from the intense heat and smoke. The cause of the fire is unknown.


Also, from the New York Times (Saturday 15th February 1975):


Fire Commissioner John T. O'Hagan said yesterday that he would make a vigorous effort to have a sprinkler system installed in the World Trade Center towers as a consequence of the fire that burned for three hours in one of them early yesterday morning.

The towers, each 110 stories tall and the highest structures in the city, are owned and operated by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, which is not subject to local safety codes.
As Commissioner O'Hagan stood in the sooty puddles of the North Towers's 11th floor hallway, he told reporters that the fire would not have spread as far as it did if sprinklers had been installed there.
The fire spread throughout about half of the offices of the floor and ignited the insulation of telephone cables in a cable shaft that runs vertically between floors. Commissioner O'Hagan said that the absence of fire-stopper material in gaps around the telephone cables had allowed the blaze to spread to other floors within the cable shaft. Inside the shaft, it spread down to the 9th floor and up to the 16th floor, but the blaze did not escape from the shaft out into room or hallways on the other floors.
........
Only the 11th floor office area was burned, but extensive water damage occurred on the 9th and 10th floors, and smoke damage extended as far as the 15th floor, the spokesman said.
Although there were no direct casualties, 28 of the 150 firemen called to the scene suffered minor injuries.


More from the New York Times (Saturday 14th February 1975):


"It was like fighting a blow torch" according to Captain Harold Kull of Engine Co. 6,
........
Flames could be seen pouring out of 11th floor windows on the east side of the building.


more http://newjersey.indymedia.org/en/2005/04/8328.shtml

[carlvs]

12. You Got to be Kidding...

You are actually comparing this to the events of 9/11, where both towers suffered not only major fires across multiple floors, but also massive structural damage from having large planes flown into them?!?!?

[mikelewis]

101. I don't think they are hiding it...

The NIST talks about the fires in this publication. Pages 43 and 44.

"Significant Fires Prior to September 11, 2001 Significant Fires Prior to September 11, 2001
• FDNY provided information from 397 operations fire reports from 1970 to 2001 and 112 fire
investigation records from 1977 to 2001; PANYNJ records destroyed during collapse of WTC 1.
• Most significant incidents:
• Major 1975 fire in WTC 1 prior to installation of sprinklers.
• 1993 bombing in B-1 level below south face of WTC 1.
• 47 other substantial fires; activated a sprinkler or required hoses to suppress:
• 16 exercised multiple sprinklers or standpipe connected hoses (with or without at least one
sprinkler activation);
• 12 in WTC 1, 3 in WTC 2, and 1 in WTC 7.
• 12 fires occurred between 6 pm and 4 am; remainder included 2 dumpster fires, 1 kitchen fire, and 1
overheating of fan motor bearing.
• 5 unlisted/unclassified, 6 suspicious/incendiary, 2 discarded material, 3 electrical/mechanical failure.
• Only two fires extended to as much as 15% of the space on the floor.
• 31 fires involved use of one standpipe hose or one hose and discharge of one sprinkler.
• 23 in WTC 1, 7 in WTC 2
• Available evidence suggests that no fire activated more than 3 sprinklers in areas protected by
automatic sprinklers."
http://wtc.nist.gov/pubs/WTC%20Part%20IV%20-%20Life%20S...

[petgoat]

15. "none of them caught fire"/"catastrophic fires"

You're exaggerating both the opinions of others and the evidence you
have. NIST's core steel shows no evidence of heating above 250 degrees
centigrade. Supposedly the engineers were out there combing through the
wreckage for the pieces that would show what happened. The steel had a
number code on it for its location.


So either the engineers picked the wrong steel, or there never was any
that showed heating above 250, or somebody took the pieces that showed
what happened.

[Make7]

16. Supposedly...

petgoat wrote:
Supposedly the engineers were out there combing through the wreckage for the pieces that would show what happened. The steel had a number code on it for its location.

So either the engineers picked the wrong steel, or there never was any
that showed heating above 250, or somebody took the pieces that showed
what happened.

Like what this guy is supposedly doing?


()

There is more information about collecting steel samples in the document that picture is from:

http://www.house.gov/science/hot/wtc/wtc-report/WTC_apndxD.pdf

____________________

And here is a quote from a metallurgical examination of a steel sample from one of the Twin Towers:

Temperatures in this region of the steel were likely to be in the range of 700–800 °C (1,290–1,470 °F).

http://www.house.gov/science/hot/wtc/wtc-report/WTC_apndxC.pdf

-Make7

[petgoat]

25. Yes, that guy is sampling steel.

Your first link says they recovered 150 pieces.

Your second link to the FEMA Appendix C citing high temperatures in
the steel is asserted in Jim Hoffman's site to show evidence of
explosives because of the magnitude of the oxidative attack and the
presence of high amounts of non-native sulfer.

I suppose the WTC tower sample from the Appendix C is the one NIST
refers to when it says that one of its 3 (out of 170) samples of
perimeter columns that showed evidence of heating above 250 degrees C
they considered to have experienced its heating in the context of
being cooked after the collapse.

NIST does not have any core steel showing heating above 250 degrees C.
And of their perimeter column samples, only 2 of 170 show heating
above 250 degrees C. Now supposedly these guys were looking for the
steel that showed what happened. But they didn't get it. Why not?

They were lazy? There was no heating above 250? Somebody took the
pieces that showed what happened?

The FEMA Appendix C report you cited expressed the wish that the
researchers be allowed to do further study of mysterious oxidative
erosion and the mysterious sulfer. Does anyone know if they ever did
a followup report?

[hack89]

31. The sulfur came from gypsum in the wall board.

where do you think it comes from?

[petgoat]

36. The Expert Metallurgists Don't Know Where the Sulfur Came From.

"No clear explanation for the source of the sulfur has been identified."
(See p.13)

They also say the thinning of the steel is very unusual.

http://www.house.gov/science/hot/wtc/wtc-report/WTC_apndxC.pdf


I don't have an opinion on where the sulfer came from. I believe Jim
Hoffman is implying that it came from explosives.

http://911research.wtc7.net/wtc/evidence/metallurgy/index.html

For my part, I'd like to know if these three scientists from Worcester
Polytechnical Institute were invited to continue their investigations as
they wished, and whether they were invited to participate in the NIST
report, and if they ever came up with an explanation as to the source of
the sulfur.

[hack89]

38. It wasn't explosives or detonators

Lets look at explosives that are used to cut steel during controlled demolitions - like cutting charges http://www.dynawell.de/explosives_lsc.html

Metal-cutting charges are flat triangles of plastic explosive (usually plastique). A blasting cap detonator is placed in the point of the triangle. The triangle is laid down with the wide end wrapped around the material to cut. When the blast reaches the end of the explosive, it is reflected into the metal, cutting it.

A scissors charge is two of the above triangular charges, placed on opposite sides of the metal, on opposite sides of the cutting line. They must be sized and timed so the blast wave of each arrives at the same time at the cutting line. The opposing blast waves shear the metal.

Notice that they use plastic explosive such as RDX or C4, none of which use sulfur.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C4_explosive
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyclotrimethylene_trinitra...

Now as for blasting cap detonators

Many detonators' primary explosive is a material called ASA compound. This compound is formed from lead azide, lead styphnate and aluminium and is pressed into place above the base charge usually TNT or tetryl in military detonators and PETN in commercial detonators. Other materials such as DDNP (diazo dinitro phenol) are also used as the primary charge to reduce the amount of lead emitted into the atmosphere by mining and quarrying operations. Old detonators used mercury fulminate as the primary, and it was often mixed with potassium chlorate to yield better performance.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Detonators

and

Explosives commonly used in blasting caps include mercury fulminate, sodium azide, lead azide, and tetryl.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blasting_cap

Sorry but no mention of sulfur based explosives.


As for a source of the sulfur:

The calcium carbonate of the limestone produces pH-neutral calcium sulfate that is physically removed from the scrubber. That is, the scrubber turns sulfur pollution into industrial sulfates.

In some areas the sulfates are sold to chemical companies as gypsum when the purity of calcium sulfate is high. In others, they are placed in a land-fill

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Acid_rain

[stickdog]

65. I HATE disinformation.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/explosives-compositions.htm

Dynamite was originally a mixture of nitroglycerin and diato-mite, a porous, inert silica. Today, straight nitroglycerin dynamite consists of nitroglycerin, with sodium nitrate, antacid, carbonaceous fuel, and sometimes sulfur in place of the inert filler. It is most commonly manufactured in weight strengths of 20 to 60 percent. Because of the tendency of nitroglycerin to freeze at low working temperature, another explosive oil usually replaces part of the nitroglycerin in a straight dynamite.

Blasting gelatin is a rubber-textured explosive made by adding nitrocellulose (guncotton) to nitroglycerin. An antacid is added for stability in storage. Wood meal is usually added to improve sensitivity. Blasting gelatin attains a very high detonation velocity and has excellent water resistance, but it emits large volumes of noxious fumes upon detonation. It is the most powerful of all commercial explosives. Straight gelatin is a dense, plastic explosive consisting of nitroglycerin or other explosive oil gelatinized with. nitrocellulose, an antacid, sodium nitrate, carbonaceous fuel, and sometimes sulfur. Since the gelatin tends to coat the other ingredients, straight gelatin is water-proof. Straight gelatin is the equivalent of straight dynamite in the dynamite category and is manufactured in weight strengths of 20 to 90 percent with corresponding cartridge strengths of 30 to 80 percent. The cartridge strength or the weight strength may be referred to by the manufacturer as the “grade” of the gelatin, a term which is confusing. Straight gelatin has been used in very hard rock or as a bottom charge in a column of explosives. It has been replaced in most applications by a more economical substitute such as ammonia gelatin, brit higher grades are still used in underwater blasting and in deep well shooting.

Slurries, sometimes called water gels, contain ammonium nitrate partly in aqueous solution. Depending on the remainder of the ingredients, slurries can be classified as either blasting agents or explosives. Slurry blasting agents contain nonexplosive sensitizers or fuels such as carbon, sulfur, or aluminum, and are not cap sensitive; whereas slurry explosives contain cap- sensitive ingredients such as TNT and the mixture itself may be cap sensitive. Slurries are thickened and gelled with a gum, such as guar gum, to give considerable water resistance.

The nitroglycerin used in dynamites is also thickened or gelatinized by the addition of a small percentage of nitrocellulose. This helps prevent the liquid from "weeping" or separating from the absorbent. Because settling does occur, boxes of stored nongelled dynamites are turned over at regular intervals to reverse the settling flow. However, old and deteriorated dynamite may have exhuded allowing the liquid explosive to seep through the wax impregnated kraft paper.

http://www.fireandsafety.eku.edu/VFRE-99/Recognition/High/high.htm

Uses - Construction, Road Building, Quarrying, Mining, Destruction

Ingredients:

Nitroglycerine (NG), Ethylene Glycol Dinitrate (EGDN), Ammonium Nitrate (AN), Nitrocellulose (NC), Sodium Nitrate (SN), Carbonaceous Fuel (wood pulp & ground shells), Sulfur.


http://www.solvayvishnubarium.com/market/explosivesindustry/0,,5251-2-0,00.htm

http://www.du.edu/~jcalvert/phys/bang.htm

All the explosives we have so far discussed depend on the nitro or nitrate groups. As mentioned above, nitrates were often scarce and expensive, especially in time of war, so alternatives to nitrate explosives were sought. The only real alternative was to mixes containing chlorates, which are widely used in pyrotechnics. French Cheddite was an example of such explosives, which used 60%-80% ammonium, sodium or potassium chlorate or perchlorate, with some fuel such as carbon, sulphur, aluminium or vegetable meals. Some aromatic nitro compounds improved flame propagation, and paraffin or castor oil was added as a desensitizer. In Germany, a little nitroglycerine or collodion cotton was added to increase the brisance. These explosives were used in mining and quarrying, not for military purposes, for which they released scarce nitrates.

...

[Make7]

40. I suppose...

petgoat wrote:
I suppose the WTC tower sample from the Appendix C is the one NIST refers to when it says that one of its 3 (out of 170) samples of perimeter columns that showed evidence of heating above 250 degrees C they considered to have experienced its heating in the context of being cooked after the collapse.

Why do you suppose that is a perimeter column? I don't recall seeing it identified as such in the report.

And why do you suppose it was "cooked after the collapse"? The report clearly states that they do not know when the heating and corrosion took place.

Suggestions for Future Research

The severe corrosion and subsequent erosion of Samples 1 and 2 are a very unusual event. No clear explanation for the source of the sulfur has been identified. The rate of corrosion is also unknown. It is possible that this is the result of long-term heating in the ground following the collapse of the buildings. It is also possible that the phenomenon started prior to collapse and accelerated the weakening of the steel structure. A detailed study into the mechanisms of this phenomenon is needed to determine what risk, if any, is presented to existing steel structures exposed to severe and long-burning fires.

http://www.house.gov/science/hot/wtc/wtc-report/WTC_apndxC.pdf

____________________

Hoffman....isn't he the guy that said conventional explosives were not likely to have been used? I seem to recall he said that he thought it was advanced microwave weapons. Do those create sulfur when activated?

-Make7

[stickdog]

57. You are speculating. Where is a shred of EVIDENCE that ANY

temperature high enough to seriously weaken steel was ever reached at any time before the towers fell for more than a few seconds?

Yes, I'm asking for your EVIDENCE, NIST lover. Where is it?

[undeterred]

10. There was a part which landed on a rooftop

and ended up for auction on EBAY by an Australian. EBAY took the page down, realizing it was in poor taste.

[philb]

33. Mechanical Eng. debunks official story of WTC

Mysteries of the Twin Towers Roger Herbst BAAE, ME May 2004
http://septembereleventh.org/documents/rodgwtcpdf.pdf

[LARED]

55. It's only regurgitated CT sophistry (n/t)

[stickdog]

58. That's telling 'em.

[LARED]

60. What kind of reply would you expect?

The paper is simply a regurgitation of prevalent CT sophistry available on somewhere around 1 million web site. Stuff that has been identified and debunked numerous times by more objective people.

There nothing to indicate he formed an opinion as an engineer. There is nothing new or informative to see. Apparently what makes it important is the guy puts BAAE, ME after his name.

I could do the same thing.

LARED, ASME, ME. There you go, am I now more believable in your opinion?

[Make7]

61. That only works when your views fit in with their theories. ( n/t )

[petgoat]

96. LARED, ASME, ME. There you go, am I now more believable

"Roger Herbst" BSEE, ME at least purports to publish under his real
name.

[LARED]

107. Is petgoat your real name?

Mom and dad had an unusual sense of humor.

Actually you really don't know if Roger Herbst is his real name. If my moniker was my real name would it make a difference anyway?

[petgoat]

125. I'm not claiming "petgoat, ASME, ME" gives me credibility n/t

[LARED]

127. Is it safe to assume you believe that because

someone regurgitating prevalent CT theories puts BAAE, ME after their name is somehow more credible?